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Under what conditions do the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members 
use peaceful means to resolve their maritime disputes? Why do they resort to military 
action in some cases, and compromise peacefully in others? This thesis answers these 
questions by investigating two variables that influence the course of such disputes: the 
presence of natural resources and disputes over sovereign control of maritime features. 
This thesis examines four cases of maritime dispute resolution: maritime delimitation in 
the Singapore Strait by Indonesia and Singapore; joint-development in the Gulf of 
Thailand; the Pedra Branca dispute between Singapore and Malaysia; and recurring 
violence in the South China Sea, involving multiple states in the region. 
After analyzing the case studies, this research finds that the presence of natural 
resources, and of conflicting claims of sovereignty over islands or other related features, 
strongly affect the outcome of the maritime disputes. In general, four different outcomes 
are possible: maritime delimitation, joint development, third-party settlement, and violent 
conflict. Southeast Asian countries are likely to employ peaceful measures in a situation 
where at least one of the two variables studied here is absent. If both of them are present, 
maritime disputes will likely end in violence. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Southeast Asia is considered a peaceful region due to the absence of major 
conflict there since the Cambodian-Vietnamese War in the late 1970s. One factor that has 
maintained peace among Southeast Asian states is the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), which has developed key norms in resolving disputes, namely 
“settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means,” and “renunciation of the threat 
or use of force” in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).1 However, since the 
establishment of the TAC in 1976, there have been serious tensions, mainly border 
disputes, among ASEAN members that have harmed the spirit of peace in Southeast 
Asia. The most prominent conflict between the TAC signatories is the Preah Vihear 
Temple dispute along Cambodian-Thai border, 2008–2011, during which troops from 
both sides clashed, resulting in at least 36 deaths, hundreds wounded, and thousands 
displaced.2 On the maritime side, the overlapping claims over features in the South China 
Sea attract the world’s attention. 
The Malaysian scholar Joon Nam Mak has argued that ASEAN members adhere 
to the TAC norms of peaceful dispute resolution and the non-use of force in land-border 
disputes but not in maritime ones.3 This argument is subject to debate since most 
maritime border disputes have been managed peacefully, even though several of them 
involved military power. Some of the peaceful resolutions among ASEAN members in 
resolving maritime border disputes are Malaysia-Thailand’s agreement of joint-
development in the Gulf of Thailand in 1979, Myanmar-Thailand’s maritime boundary 
agreement in the Andaman Sea in 1980, a joint-development agreement between 
                                                 
1 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” accessed January 21, 2016, 
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20131230235433.pdf. 
2 Kathy Quiano, “Thailand, Cambodia Make Progress on Border Dispute,” CNN.com, accessed May 
21, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/09/thailand.cambodia.dispute/. 
3 Joon Nam Mak, “Sovereignty in ASEAN and the Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South 
China Sea,” in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative 
Management Regime, ed. W. S. G. Bateman and Ralf Emmers, Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series 9 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 112. 
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Malaysia and Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand in June 1992, and Thailand-Vietnam’s 
EEZ agreement in the Gulf of Thailand in 1997.4 These circumstances motivate this 
thesis to argue that Mak’s opinion, which states that TAC norms do not apply in the 
maritime realm, is not correct since there are so many cases of peaceful resolution. 
ASEAN members do not resolve all maritime disputes peacefully, however. They have 
militarized disputes over some territories, such as the Ambalat region east of Borneo and 
the Spratly region in the South China Sea. Thus, the question this thesis aims to answer 
is: when do ASEAN members follow or not follow TAC norms in maritime border 
disputes?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The stability of the region is absolute in establishing the ASEAN Political 
Security Community (APSC), one of the three pillars of ASEAN Community. This lofty 
goal relies heavily on the TAC as “the key code of conduct” governing relations between 
ASEAN members for the promotion of peace and stability in the region.5 Having the 
TAC as a general guidance for dispute resolution, ASEAN members are still involved in 
disputes over land and maritime borders, which could hamper the realization of the 
APSC. The security community will not be entirely established as long as ASEAN 
members still live in suspicion of each other. The fact that there are still many disputes 
over the boundaries could destabilize the region, since territorial disputes can lead to a 
war.6  
It is important to know the situations that influence ASEAN members to take 
either peaceful or violent responses. Understanding maritime conflict management 
between Southeast Asian countries would help us to explain the conditions under which 
ASEAN members uphold or violate their own norms. Moreover, by knowing the 
                                                 
4 Ramses Amer, “Managing Border Disputes in South East Asia,” Kajian Malaysia 18, no. 1 and 2 
(2000): 33–4. 
5 Daniel Seah, “The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Issue of Non-
Intervention and Its Accession by Australia and the USA,” Chinese Journal of International Law 11, no. 4 
(2012): 792. 
6 John Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992,” 
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (March 1, 2001): 136, doi:10.2307/425491. 
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tendency of a country’s behavior, it would help policymakers and scholars predict the 
possible outcomes of maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and take necessary actions to 
prevent conflict escalation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will review key literature including books, articles, and some treaties 
to provide enough background relating to the border disputes and Southeast Asian 
conflict management. First, the literature review discusses the previous research about 
border disputes. Previous research concurs that two factors caused countries to either 
peacefully settle or enter armed conflict: the value of the disputed areas, either tangible or 
intangible, and domestic political factors. This section will then discuss the historical 
background of maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia. Finally, this literature review 
provides a summary of the two competing perspectives in Southeast Asian literature 
between those who believe that TAC norms contribute to the peaceful resolution of 
maritime territorial disputes and those who argue that TAC norms fail to prevent the use 
of force to resolve those disputes. This literature review includes some brief reviews of 
resolved and ongoing maritime disputes to provide a big picture of maritime disputes in 
Southeast Asia. 
1. Theories of Border Disputes 
Borders define a territory of a country to exercise its sovereignty over domestic 
affairs from intervention of other countries. In the world, there are 300 land boundaries 
and 130 maritime boundaries that separate more than 200 countries.7 The Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty shapes national pride and economic interest, which are common 
reasons to justify the use of forces in territorial disputes. However, few conflicts have 
been resolved through military action, as described by Paul R. Hensel’s data of 191 
dyadic territorial claims across the world. Hensel’s data shows that those “claims have 
                                                 
7 Rongxing Guo, The Land and Maritime Boundary Disputes of Asia, Asian Political, Economic and 
Security Issues Series (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009), 5. 
 4
been managed through 205 militarized interstate disputes and 1004 peaceful settlement 
attempts.”8 
Many experts in territorial disputes have tried to explain why a country chooses 
either a peaceful or militarized approach to resolving territorial conflicts. Most of them 
find that this choice is influenced by the value of the territory and by domestic political 
factors. A territory can have both tangible and intangible values that motivate a state to 
claim it and to engage in disputes over it. Tangible value includes economic resources 
and strategic value, whereas examples of intangible value are historical status and 
national pride. John Vasquez states that the disputes over tangible-valued areas are likely 
to be resolved by peaceful means and less frequently involve the use of military forces.9 
Comparing economic and strategic value, Paul Huth finds that strategic disputed areas 
lead states to take military action, unlike in resource-rich areas.10 Furthermore, Hensel 
and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell say that armed conflict is more likely to occur in a dispute 
over areas that have intangible value related to ethnic origin or homeland territory.11 
Various arguments about the tendency of a country’s behavior in relations with the value 
of the territory means that this field still needs further investigation to have a universal 
explanation. 
The second common explanation for a country’s behavior in dealing with a 
territorial dispute is a domestic political one. Scholars make several different arguments. 
The first is that leaders are unwilling to make unpopular decisions, either engaging in 
wars or avoiding wars, with political risks. A study by Giacomo Chiozza and Henk E. 
Goemans concludes that leaders will not initiate an international crisis in exchange for 
                                                 
8 Paul R. Hensel, “The ICOW Territorial Claims Data Set,” ICOW Project, accessed May 19, 2015, 
http://www.paulhensel.org/icowterr.html. 
9 John A Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 77–8, 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10450863. 
10 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 147–8. 
11 Paul R Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims,” 
GeoJournal 64, no. 4 (2005): 283, doi:10.1007/s10708-005-5803-3. 
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their position.12 Military action causes huge political risks for the leaders as wars might 
cost severe loss of materials without any guarantee of winning. On the contrary, Huth 
finds that political leaders will not give up territory to avoid political attack from the 
opposition.13 His argument comes from the notion of sovereignty, which is often 
considered by domestic political actors as a manifestation of national pride that is 
worthwhile to pursue. A second argument is that leaders may use disputes to increase 
their popularity at home and gain political support. In support of this argument, Jaroslav 
Tir says that the choice of engaging in armed conflict is more likely for leaders that face 
domestic problems.14 The investigation using this lens in examining Southeast Asian 
maritime border disputes might account for broader factors in domestic politics. 
2. Historical Background  
At the end of the colonial era in Southeast Asia post-WW II, states followed the 
principle of uti possidetis juris (“as you possess under law”) to determine their borders. 
This means that their borders are based on what they inherited from their former 
colonizers.15 The region does not consist of a set of ethno-states or follow the principle of 
terra nullius (“uninhabited territory”).16 All Southeast Asian countries except Thailand 
were colonies of the Western countries, and gained their independence in the mid-
twentieth century in the aftermath of World War II. Even though Thailand was never 
formally colonized, its borders are defined by surrounding states, which are the result of 
colonization. Indonesia’s territory from Sabang to Merauke was a former Dutch colony, 
initially many different kingdoms spread throughout the archipelago. Spain’s colony, 
later succeeded by the United States, was the Philippines. The French and British 
dominated mainland Southeast Asia before the end of WWII, resulting in the 
                                                 
12 Giacomo Chiozza and Henk E. Goemans, “Avoiding Diversionary Targets,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 4 (2004): 439, doi:10.2307/4149682. 
13 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 178–9. 
14 Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The 
Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 419, doi:10.1017/S0022381609990879. 
15 Mak, “Sovereignty in ASEAN,” 10. 
16 David B. Carter and H. E. Goemans, “The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the 
Emergence of Interstate Conflict,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (2011): 286, 
doi:10.1017/S0020818311000051. 
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independence of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The British also granted independence to 
Malaysia, Singapore, and later Brunei Darussalam. These newly formed states inherited 
relatively clear land territories without clear maritime boundaries.  
The first claim of national sovereignty on the sea was in 1945, when U.S. 
President Harry S. Truman asserted United States sovereignty over natural resources on 
its continental shelf, a landmass beneath the sea.17 There were sporadic claims by 
countries around the world following the United States’ declaration of its own rights on 
the sea, especially motivated by economic and sovereignty factors. Stimulated by 
potential disputes that might worsen the exploitation of the sea, UN conventions managed 
to formulate and finalize the Law of the Sea in the third convention in 1982, which was 
enforced in 1994 after the 60th country signed the treaty.18 The treaty adopts the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf that governs international law relating to continental 
shelves. All coastal ASEAN members have ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Scholars differ in perceiving the adoption of new international laws like 
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and UNCLOS in relations with interstate disputes. The 
first perspective argues that the adoption of EEZ and UNCLOS could promote 
cooperation and stability. A quantitative study from Stephen C. Nemeth et. al., which 
observed “peaceful and militarized maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and 
Europe” from 1900 to 2001, concludes that privatization of the sea through the adoption 
of EEZs has bolstered peaceful resolution through bilateral negotiations.19 Further, they 
state, “UNCLOS is also effective for preventing the onset of new disagreement over 
maritime areas.”20  
                                                 
17 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective,” United Nations, 
accessed September 28, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Stephen C. Nemeth et al., “Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime Conflicts through UNCLOS and 




The second camp sees that the adoption of new rules could potentially bring out 
new disagreements due to misconception of the rules. Prescott and Schofield state that 
disputes over maritime boundaries are more likely because of the absence of colonial-era 
lines defining maritime borders.21 Data from Prescott and Schofield show that 259 or 
58% of maritime boundaries in the world do not have formal agreements and are subject 
to dispute.22 The different interpretation of the rules may cause disputes because “under 
UNCLOS, entitlement to maritime zones is generated only by land territory, including 
islands”; however, UNCLOS does not address the issue of sovereignty over land 
territory.23 Prescott and Gillian D. Triggs write that there are two possible aims in which 
countries initiate territorial disputes, namely to strengthen the state by adding new 
territories, or as a diversionary strategy related to their domestic or foreign policy.24 In 
addition, causal factors of maritime disputes in Southeast Asia, as Lawrence Prabhakar 
mentions, include sovereignty concerns, national identity, and resources management.25 
3. Competing Resolution Perspectives in ASEAN 
There are two perspectives about the role of ASEAN in creating the stability of 
Southeast Asia. One side argues that ASEAN works well in preventing conflict 
escalations, whereas the other side claims that ASEAN and its regional mechanism are 
less effective for creating a peaceful region. Both camps bring their own arguments to 
analyze the dynamics of Southeast Asian international relations. 
Some scholars argue that the nature of the disputes in Southeast Asia is limited to 
low-intensity conflicts. Major territorial conflicts tend not to occur in the Southeast Asian 
region. Prabhakar argues that conflicts in the region never escalate because ASEAN 
                                                 
21 Victor Prescott and Clive Howard Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 2nd 
ed (Leiden ; Boston: M. Nijhoff, 2005), 215–6. 
22 Ibid., 245. 
23 Robert Beckman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the 
South China Sea,” American Journal of International Law 107, no. 1 (2013): 142. 
24 Victor Prescott and Gillian D. Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries (Leiden ; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 99. 
25 W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “The Regional Dimension of Territorial and Maritime Disputes in 
Southeast Asia,” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, ed. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan, 
Routledge Security in Asia Series 4 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 35. 
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manages to address the disputes “through conflict management, with an emphasis on the 
processes of conflict avoidance, prevention, and eventual conflict resolution.”26 The 
relative peace of Southeast Asia can be understood from several supporting factors. The 
analysis of Nemeth et. al. shows that the adoption of the UNCLOS and EEZs could 
explain the pacification of Southeast Asia.27 All of the nine ASEAN members—
excluding Laos, which is landlocked—have ratified the UNCLOS.28 In addition, 
Southeast Asian countries are bound within ASEAN, a regional institution aiming to 
promote regional stability. In anticipating the possibility of ASEAN members engaging 
in inter-state disputes, ASEAN provides rules about ways to resolve conflicts peacefully: 
the TAC. This treaty guides its signatories to settle differences by peaceful means and 
refuse to use force to resolve disputes.29 In case a dispute emerges, disputing parties 
should cooperate in friendly negotiations.30 
This TAC is claimed to be the application of the “ASEAN Way” in creating a 
peaceful region. Shaun Narine posits that the ASEAN approach is the key to a peaceful 
region.31 Amitav Acharya further explains the ASEAN way as a part of ASEAN socio-
cultural norms. According to him, the ASEAN way is a pattern of consultation and 
consensus building among ASEAN members in resolving problems.32 This mechanism 
ultimately creates what Soeharto called “regional resilience,” which contributes to 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 34. 
27 Nemeth et al., “Ruling the Sea,” 732. 
28 “Chronological Lists of Ratifications Of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the 
Related Agreements as at 3 October 2014,” United Nations, January 7, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. 
29 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,” article 2. 
30 Ibid., article 13. 
31 Shaun Narine, “The English School and ASEAN,” The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 203–4, 
doi:10.1080/09512740500473247. 
32 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem 
of Regional Order, 2nd ed, Politics in Asia Series (Milton Park: Routledge, 2009), 24. 
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security for the ASEAN members.33 “The ASEAN way,” Collins adds, “managed to 
contain some problems faced by the members from further escalated tensions.”34 
However, some skeptical scholars question the role of ASEAN in establishing 
regional stability. Dewi Fortuna Anwar doubts ASEAN members regard ASEAN as their 
top priority. According to her, the existence of ASEAN is only to support national 
interests, thus ASEAN is placed after national preference.35 She argues that peaceful 
coexistence in Southeast Asia is sometimes interrupted by small disputes, as Southeast 
Asian members have experienced frequently. There are several instances in which 
ASEAN members have been involved in disputes, especially concerning territorial 
borders. An example of territorial conflict among ASEAN members is the dispute over 
the Preah Vihear temple between Thailand and Cambodia. In the maritime realm, the 
conflicts in the South China Sea underline the fact that the complexities of defining sea 
boundaries might exacerbate rivalry between countries. Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore demonstrate that the close relations between them do not prevent them from 
sea border disputes over Ambalat and Pedra Branca. Hari Singh further judges that 
Southeast Asian states see their neighbors as potential adversaries rather than friends in a 
security community.36  
Those scholars highlight the tendency of ASEAN members to engage in border 
disputes, showing that countries may choose not to follow the TAC norms of peaceful 
dispute resolution and non-use of force, despite their frequent statements of support for 
those norms. Mak notes that the TAC is merely useful in handling land disputes but not 
maritime ones.37 He claims that ASEAN uses a double standard in conflict management; 
for example, ASEAN condemned Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, but then took no 
                                                 
33 Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 113. 
34 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 133–7. 
35 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia: National vs Regional Resilience,” in Southeast Asian 
Perspectives on Security, ed. Derek Da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 92. 
36 Hari Singh, “Vietnam and ASEAN: The Politics of Accommodation,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997): 226, doi:10.1080/10357719708445211. 
37 Mak, “Sovereignty in ASEAN,” 1–2. 
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stance over China’s occupation of Mischief Reef, a feature that the Philippines claims in 
the South China Sea.38 To support his argument, Mak provides instances of militarized 
disputes that involve ASEAN forces in challenging other members in maritime conflicts, 
such as several aggressive actions by Malaysia in the South China Sea occupying features 
by using naval task forces, and the contestation between Indonesia and Malaysia over 
Sipadan and Ligitan islands.39 He argues that Southeast Asian members do not obey the 
TAC in maritime disputes, contrary to their behavior in land border problems, because 
“the maritime realm [is] different from the terrestrial realm,” because in maritime areas 
“sovereignty is still highly contested.”40 
4. Peaceful Conflict Management of Maritime Disputes in Southeast 
Asia 
Not all disagreements between ASEAN members are solved in contentious ways. 
The use of military force to resolve maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia is only 
one possibility. History reveals that most disputes, including maritime disputes, are 
solved or managed peacefully. In fact, Southeast Asian countries have taken three 
different types of peaceful approaches to maritime disputes. The first two result in the 
delimitation of borders. One is bilateral negotiation between the parties to the dispute. 
The second is the submission of conflicting claims to international bodies, such as the 
International Court of Justice, for adjudication. The third approach is the joint 
development of resources in disputed areas, but unlike the first two this approach does 
not lead to the delimitation of new borders.  
ASEAN members have demonstrated peaceful settlement of maritime disputes 
through bilateral agreements that result in agreed upon delimitation of boundaries. In 
1969, Indonesia and Malaysia negotiated their first maritime boundary agreement, in 
which they agreed to the delimitation of their continental shelf in the Strait of Malacca 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 14–5. 
39 Ibid., 5–8. 
40 Ibid., 22. 
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and the South China Sea.41  In the following year, both neighboring countries agreed to 
their territorial sea limit in the Strait of Malacca. In 1974, Indonesia and Singapore 
reached an agreement delimiting their three-mile lines in the Strait of Malacca and 
Singapore.42 Malaysia and Thailand have also compromised their territorial sea limit in 
the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Thailand in 1979.43 Later, Thailand and Vietnam 
agreed to the delimitation of their EEZ and continental shelf boundaries in the Gulf of 
Thailand in 1997.44 All of these agreements contain an article that obliges the signatories 
to resolve any future dispute peacefully.45 These articles demonstrate the influence of the 
ASEAN way on ASEAN members, since they agreed among themselves to peaceful 
settlements through consultation or negotiation. 
The cases of Sipadan Ligitan and Pedra Branca are the only examples of maritime 
disputes in South East Asia that have been settled through the ICJ. Indonesia and 
Malaysia brought the dispute over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan to the ICJ in 1999 
after suspending negotiations over the boundary in the area that had continued since 
1969.46 The court then awarded the islands in favor of Malaysia on December 17, 2002, 
on the basis of the effectivité, because Malaysia had proven its occupation in the islands 
more effectively than Indonesia.47 For the Pedra Branca dispute, the ICJ made decisions 
over sovereignty of the three islands in the Strait of Malacca: Pedra Branca, Middle 
Rocks, and South Ledge. The disputes over those islands arose in 1979 when Malaysia 
                                                 
41 Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 1 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 1019–27. 
42 Ibid., 1:1049–52. 
43 Ibid., 1:1091–8. 
44 Amer, “Managing Border Disputes,” 34. 
45 Charney et al., International Maritime Boundaries, 1:1036. 1097, and 1106. 
46 John G. Butcher, “The International Court of Justice and the Territorial Dispute between Indonesia 
and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 35, no. 2 (2013): 237–8. 
47 “Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia): 
Judgment of 17 December 2002” (Hague: International Court of Justice, 2002), 685–6, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf. 
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published its new map, Peta Baru.48 In 1998, both governments agreed to submit this 
dispute to the ICJ. In 2008, the court determined that Singapore has sovereignty over 
Pedra Branca, but sovereignty over Middle Rocks lies with Malaysia, whereas who owns 
South Ledge was not specifically decided.49 The same effort is being conducted by the 
Philippines responding to the aggressiveness of China. The Philippines submitted its 
disputes with China to UNCLOS arbitration on January 22, 2013, which was opposed by 
China.50 
Not all maritime disputes reach peaceful resolution, but not all unsettled disputes 
end in violence either. Joint development over a contested area is one possible alternative 
taken by Southeast Asian countries, which is demonstrated in the Gulf of Thailand by 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Following the agreement over their territorial sea 
borders, Malaysia and Thailand agreed “to establish a joint authority for the exploitation 
of resources in a defined area” in the Gulf of Thailand by signing a Memorandum of 
Understandings.51 In 1992, Vietnam followed by signing an agreement with Malaysia to 
engage in joint exploitation of their overlapping continental shelves.52 
The three types of friendly approaches in resolving maritime disputes made by 
ASEAN members show that they are likely to resolve their disputes in peaceful ways; 
bilateral agreement is the most preferred option among them. Nevertheless, sometimes 
two-sided discussion cannot resolve the problems easily. Damon Bristow argues that 
polarized opinion over sensitive national issues prevents ASEAN members from entering 
                                                 
48 Robert Beckman and Clive Howard Schofield, “Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island Sovereignty: 
ICJ Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait,” Ocean Development 
& International Law 40, no. 1 (2009): 3, doi:10.1080/00908320802631551. 
49 International Court of Justice, “Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore): Summary of the Judgement of 23 May 2008,” June 23, 2008, 13, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14506.pdf. 
50 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China,” 
accessed May 19, 2015, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529. 
51 Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, 1:1107–23. 
52 Amer, “Managing Border Disputes,” 33. 
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into binding bilateral treaties.53 Moreover, he adds that ASEAN is not like NATO or the 
EU in influencing its members; the nature of ASEAN as a loose institution gives it less 
clout to force its members to conduct bilateral meetings.54 Robert Beckman and Clive 
Schofield highlight the importance of national politics, which they suggest often become 
barriers in achieving bilateral agreements.55 Indonesia and Thailand have become the top 
two settled-boundary countries because the two countries are more willing than the others 
to bring their problems into formal resolutions.56 
These arguments, then, suggest the need for third-party settlements. Many 
scholars criticize the involvement of the ICJ in ASEAN members’ conflict resolutions as 
it indicates some missing mechanism within ASEAN. Ramses Amer proposes the 
establishment of the High Council as mandated by the TAC and the integration of all 
ASEAN members into conflict management to prevent ASEAN members from 
submitting their disputes to outsiders.57 However, he is one of the optimists in viewing 
ASEAN boundary disputes; he suggests that the problems of border disputes among 
Southeast Asian countries are tending towards resolution of border conflicts.58  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are four types of maritime border dispute resolution in Southeast Asia. One 
is military and potentially violent, and the others are peaceful: bilateral border 
negotiations, joint-development of resources in disputed territories, and international 
courts or tribunals. This thesis argues that such outcomes were mainly influenced by 
economic values of the disputed areas and sovereignty status of the islands or maritime 
                                                 
53 Damon Bristow, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Maritime Disputes between 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States,” The RUSI Journal 141, no. 4 (August 
1, 1996): 36, doi:10.1080/03071849608446047. 
54 Ibid., 35. 
55 Beckman and Schofield, “Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island Sovereignty,” 26. 
56 Ramses Amer, “Expanding ASEAN’s Conflict Management Framework in Southeast Asia: The 
Border Dispute Dimension,” Asian Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (December 1998): 43, 
doi:10.1080/02185379808434124. 
57 Ibid., 48. 
58 Ibid., 42–3. 
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features related to the disputed seas. The record of disputed seas in Southeast Asian 
region related to their economic value and land status is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   List of Disputed Seas and Maritime Delimitations  
in Southeast Asia. 







1. Andaman Sea Hi Clear 
2. Andaman Sea west of Pakchan River Lo Clear 
3. Northern Strait of Malacca Hi Clear 
4. Strait of Malacca Lo Clear 
5. Strait of Johor Lo Clear 
6. Strait of Singapore Lo Clear 
7. Eastern Strait of Singapore Lo Unclear 
8. Indian Ocean (Northern Christmas Island) Lo Clear 
9. Indian Ocean (around Andaman basin) Lo Clear 
10. Gulf of Thailand Hi Clear 
11. Southern South China Sea Hi Clear 
12. South China Sea Hi Unclear 
13. Sulu Sea Hi Clear 
14. Celebes Sea Hi Unclear 
15. Pacific Ocean Lo Clear 
16. Arafura Sea Lo Clear 
17. Timor Sea Hi Clear 
18. Banda and Sawu Sea Lo Clear 
Adapted from: Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, vols. 1 and 
2; Vivian Louis Forbes, Indonesia’s Delimited Maritime Boundaries (London: Springer, 
2014); and R. Haller-Trost, The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of 
Malaysia (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
The observation over maritime border disputes in Southeast Asia suggests that 
tangible value is a more important incentive for countries in disputing some portion of 
waters than intangible value. The intangible value becomes more critical when driven by 
domestic politics, as in the Ambalat case. The land status, which is used for baselines or 
basepoints in the delimitation of disputed waters, serves as the second important factor. 
Baselines from a clear land status inherited from colonial era will likely result in peaceful 
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settlement, whereas unclear land or island status will likely drive the disputants into 
violent disputes. 
From that explanation, this thesis has developed four hypotheses to explain each 
dispute resolution. First, disputed waters with lack of natural resources derived from clear 
inherited baselines will likely be resolved in bilateral agreement that ends up mostly on 
clear delimitation. Second, resource-rich disputed waters stretched from clear land 
boundaries will also be settled in bilateral agreement with the possibility of joint-
development. Third, countries will likely seek solution from a third party like the ICJ in 
resolving disputes over waters that lack resources and clear inherited borders. Fourth, 
countries will likely be more aggressive in defending claims over resource-rich areas 
without clear sovereignty inherited from colonial powers. These four hypotheses 
underline the importance of the legal status of the land or islands in determining maritime 
boundaries. Because Southeast Asian countries adopt the principle of uti possidetis juris, 
the behavior of terra nullius over unclear islands makes dispute resolutions more 
complex with a greater likelihood of using military power.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN   
This thesis will examine both peaceful and militarized disputes in Southeast Asia 
that involve Southeast Asian countries as well as China. The thesis will use the 
comparative study method by analyzing a set of case studies of border disputes in 
Southeast Asia. A case study is the best way to discuss the topic because it provides 
concrete examples of maritime disputes in the region and it allows using “multiple 
methods and data sources to explore it and interrogate it.”59 Given this method, this thesis 
uses qualitative historical study of the selected case studies. The purpose of this research 
method is to achieve a rich description of the Southeast Asian maritime dispute 
phenomena, which might further be applied to the other disputes. The thesis organizes the 
discussion of the case studies into four different dispute resolutions: bilateral agreement, 
                                                 
59 Sheila Stark and Harry Torrance, “Case Study,” in Research Methods in the Social Sciences, ed. 
Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), 33. 
 16
joint-development, third-party settlement through international arbitration, and violent 
action. 
This thesis will discuss the maritime delimitation agreement between Indonesia 
and Singapore in the Singapore Strait as the first case study. This case study is a good 
example of disputes over resource-scarce seas with a clear legal status of islands that 
resulted in clear delimitation. The joint development arrangements in the Gulf of 
Thailand practiced by Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are discussed as the next case 
study. The third case study is a dispute over Pedra Branca island between Singapore and 
Malaysia that ended up to the ICJ decision. It is a good example of an alternative solution 
over invaluable waters and unclear islands. The last case study is the South China Sea 
disputes, an area believed to be resource-rich, which attracts several ASEAN members 
and China. This area has attracted international attention with the involvement of China, 
which asserts its claim without regarding other claimants’ proposals.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to deeply analyze each case study from a legal 
perspective; it will merely focus on what is behind each decision-making process. Each 
case study will be analyzed using two variables: the value of the disputed waters and the 
sovereignty status of the land or islands when the disputes emerged. This thesis will 
follow what Prescott and Triggs suggest in every analysis of boundary disputes.60 Each 
case will be analyzed based on information available on four aspects, namely the cause of 
the disputes, the trigger actions, the strongest arguments, and the result of the actions 
taken. The analysis of these variables will conclude the case studies into the hypotheses.  
For the data source to support the analysis, this thesis will use both primary and 
secondary sources. Primary source documents like the ASEAN charter, the TAC, the 
UNCLOS, and all available agreements and treaties between contracting parties, will 
establish the empirical basis of this thesis. To support the primary sources, secondary 
sources such as scholarly journals and commentary from credible news organizations will 
be used to provide a complete and up-to-date picture of the interactions between the 
disputants. 
                                                 
60 Prescott and Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries, 91–3. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides the general overview 
of the thesis, theoretical foundations, as well as reviews of the maritime disputes and 
conflict management in Southeast Asia from credible scholars. Chapter II discusses 
peaceful resolutions of the maritime disputes by addressing the case studies of the 
maritime delimitation between Indonesia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait. Chapter 
III addresses peaceful resolution in a form of joint development by examining the Gulf of 
Thailand case. Chapter IV examines the disputes between Singapore and Malaysia over 
Pedra Branca islands to analyze when countries seek a third party’s help in solving their 
problems. Chapter V concentrates the discussion over the South China Sea disputes. 
Chapter VI is the conclusion. It summarizes the result of analysis of the case studies and 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 19
II. DELIMITATION ARRANGEMENTS 
Delimitation arrangement through a bilateral agreement is the most common 
approach to Southeast Asian maritime disputes. From a meticulous observation of 
maritime disputes in Southeast Asia, 30 cases were solved through bilateral negotiations 
resulting in clear maritime delimitation. These agreements varied in terms of the types of 
the delimitation as well as the delimitation methods. Before discussing the case studies, 
this chapter will examine the types and methods of maritime delimitation. The general 
pattern of the maritime delimitation arrangements in Southeast Asia is that they deal with 
a portion of waters that lack natural resources and they are drawn from indisputable 
baselines. These two factors will be discussed in the case study of delimitation agreement 
between Indonesia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait. However, not all delimitation 
agreements cover resource-poor areas. The last section will address this exception by 
examining factors that drove Southeast Asian countries to agree to maritime delimitation 
in waters that could result in conflict.  
A. OVERVIEW OF MARITIME DELIMITATION ARRANGEMENTS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The delimitation arrangements of Southeast Asian maritime areas have been made 
since 1969, when Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed upon delimitation over their 
continental shelf in the Straits of Malacca, East Natuna Sea, and West Natuna Sea. 
Because at that time the 1982 UNCLOS was not yet discussed, the participation of both 
countries in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf underlay this agreement.61 
Since then, subsequent agreements followed the 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental 
Shelf Agreement. Not only the continental shelf, Southeast Asian countries also agreed to 
the territorial sea delimitation even though global agreement about the breadth of the 
territorial sea was not yet concluded. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar were 
among the states that have claimed 12 nautical-mile territorial seas following the failure 
of the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea in deciding the breadth of the territorial 
                                                 
61 “Convention on the Continental Shelf,” United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed July 23, 2015, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-4&chapter=21&lang=en. 
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sea.62 In total, 30 maritime delimitation agreements have been concluded by Southeast 
Asian countries and neighboring countries over Southeast Asian waters. The list of the 
delimitation arrangements can be seen in Table 2.  
Table 2.   List of Delimitation Arrangements in Southeast Asian Waters. 
No. Year Countries Area Type of Delimitation 
1.  1969 Indonesia, Malaysia Straits of Malacca 
West Natuna Sea 
East Natuna Sea 
Continental Shelf 
2.  1970 Indonesia, Malaysia Straits of Malacca Territorial Sea 
3.  1971 Indonesia, Australia (on 





4.  1971 Indonesia, Thailand Strait of Malacca 
Andaman Sea 
Continental Shelf 
5.  1971 Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand 
Northern Strait of 
Malacca 
Continental Shelf 
6.  1972 Indonesia, Australia Timor Sea 
Arafura Sea 
Continental Shelf 
7.  1973 Indonesia, Australia (on 
behalf PNG) 
South of New Guinea 




8.  1973 Indonesia, Singapore Straits of Malacca Territorial Sea 
9.  1974 Indonesia, India Andaman Sea between 
Nicobar Islands and 
Sumatra 
Continental Shelf 
10.  1975 Indonesia, Thailand Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
11.  1977 Indonesia, India Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
12.  1978 Thailand, India Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
13.  1978 Indonesia, Thailand, India Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
14.  1979 Malaysia, Thailand Straits of Malacca 
Gulf of Thailand 
Territorial Sea 
15.  1979 Malaysia, Thailand Gulf of Thailand Continental Shelf 
16.  1980 Myanmar, Thailand Andaman Sea Territorial Sea 
Continental Shelf 
Fishery Boundary 
                                                 
62 S. P. Jagota, Maritime Boundary, Publications on Ocean Development, v. 9 (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 
1985), 27. 
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No. Year Countries Area Type of Delimitation 
17.  1980 Indonesia, PNG Pacific Ocean Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
18.  1981 Indonesia, Australia Timor Sea Provisional 
Fishery Zone 
19.  1986 Myanmar, India Andaman Sea 
Coco Channel 




20.  1993 Thailand, India Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
21.  1993 Myanmar, Thailand, India Andaman Sea Continental Shelf 
22.  1995 Malaysia, Singapore Johor Straits Territorial Waters 
23.  1997 Indonesia, Australia Timor Sea Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
24.  1997 Thailand, Vietnam Gulf of Thailand Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
25.  2000 Vietnam, China Gulf of Tonkin Territorial Sea 
Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
26.  2003 Indonesia, Vietnam South China Sea Continental Shelf 
27.  2009 Indonesia, Singapore Western Singapore 
Strait 
Territorial Sea 
28.  2009 Brunei, Malaysia North of Borneo Territorial Sea 
Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
29.  2014 Indonesia, the Philippines Sulawesi Sea 
Mindanao Sea 
EEZ 
30.  2014 Indonesia, Singapore Singapore Strait Territorial Sea 
Adapted from: Tara Devenport, “Southeast Asian Approaches to Maritime Delimitation,” 
Asian Society of International Law: Singapore, 2012, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/TaraDavenport-ASIL-Southeast-Asian-Approaches-to-
Maritime-Delimitation.pdf.  
From Table 2, the delimitation arrangements vary by regime delimitation types. 
Five of them uniquely address territorial limits and 14 treaties cover the delimitation of 
the continental shelves. Eight other agreements have been concluded in multiple regimes, 
such as the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the fishery line, and the EEZ in a single 
agreement. The 1981 Provisional Fishery Line agreement between Indonesia and 
Australia marked the only agreement that solely rules the fishery zone in the region. 
From all the agreements, the agreement between Indonesia and Australia in Timor Sea 
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are one of the only two cases that distinguish the EEZ and Continental Shelf in the same 
region.63 In addition, not all delimitations were established bilaterally. The 1978 
Indonesia-India-Thailand Continental Shelf delimitation and the 1993 India-Myanmar-
Thailand Continental Shelf delimitation are examples of trilateral maritime delimitation 
agreements among Southeast Asian countries, which also include a neighboring country. 
Those two agreements established tri-junction boundaries that are closely related to 
bilateral agreements between the parties. The 1978 agreement followed the settled 
boundary between India and Indonesia in 1977 and Indonesian-Thailand boundary 
agreement in 1975. The agreement between Thailand and India in the area was signed on 
the same day as the trilateral agreement.64 The 1993 India-Myanmar-Thailand 
Continental Shelf delimitation in the Andaman Sea is also connected with previous 
bilateral arrangements between parties. 
1. Resource Factor 
The 30 treaties have established fixed maritime boundaries in several different 
areas in Southeast Asian waters. Among them, the Andaman Sea is an area where most of 
the maritime disputes ended in delimitations. By examining the natural resource deposits, 
most of the delimited waters are resource-scarce areas. The Andaman Sea is a clear 
example where the absence of natural resources like oil and gas has led to easier 
agreements. A report by the U.S. Geological Survey depicts the absence of oil and gas 
exploration in the Andaman Sea.65 The other map, however, shows that the area might 
have unknown potential sediment and a fair oil reserve of 1 to 10 billion barrels.66 These 
possibilities had been anticipated by countries when they signed the agreements by the 
                                                 
63 The other case is an agreement between Australia and PNG in Torres Strait, Southern Papua, in 
1978. Tara Davenport, “Southeast Asian Approaches to Maritime Delimitation,” Asian Society of 
International Law: Singapore, 2012, 20, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/TaraDavenport-ASIL-Southeast-Asian-Approaches-to-Maritime-Delimitation.pdf. 
64 Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 2 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 1380. 
65 Douglas W. Steinshouer et al., “Maps Showing Geology, Oil and Gas Fields, and Geological 
Provinces of the Asia Pacific Region,” Open-File Report (US Department of Interior and US Geological 
Survey, last modified March 25, 2013), 15, http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1997/ofr-97-470/OF97-470F. 
66 Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 103. 
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inclusion of a clause covering possible joint-exploitation and benefit sharing. The 
trilateral agreement between Indonesia, India, and Thailand of their tri-junction-point in 
the Andaman Sea addresses it in Article III, which states: 
If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or other 
mineral deposit of whatever character, extends across the boundary lines . 
. . , the three Governments shall communicate to one another all 
information in this regard and shall seek to reach agreement as to the 
manner in which the structure, field or deposit will be most effectively 
exploited and the benefits arising from such exploitation will be equitably 
shared.67 
A similar clause also appears in an agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand when the three countries compromised the three-junction-point in the Northern 
part of the Strait of Malacca.68 Despite the absence of natural resources deposits, several 
agreements have been concluded in resource-rich areas, such as in the Natuna Sea. 
2. Baseline Factor and Method of Delimitation 
Most delimitation agreements do not deal with complicated baseline 
considerations, which means that maritime boundaries are drawn from undisputed coasts 
or islands. The clear status of the coasts or islands countries has been mainly inherited 
from colonial powers. From the clear land status, not all agreements take the same 
method to determine the maritime boundaries. The common methodology to determine 
the boundary is by using an equidistant method, which is taking the same distance from 
the two adjacent coasts or baselines. Despite that method, Southeast Asian states have 
also demonstrated flexibility in determining maritime boundaries by compromising their 
maximum claims. An example of this condition is the 1973 Indonesia-Singapore 
Territorial Sea Delimitation in the Straits of Malacca. Both countries have agreed upon a 
boundary that uses a modified equidistant line, as the boundary shifts slightly to the 
south, thus favoring Singapore. This arrangement was to follow the deep-draft ship’s 
route that stretches close to the boundary.69 Myanmar and India have also agreed to 
                                                 
67 Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1387–8. 
68 Ibid., 2:1453. 
69 Charney and Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, 1051. 
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delimitating their maritime boundaries using a flexible method instead of a strict 
equidistant rule. The boundary agreed upon was drawn in favor of Myanmar by ignoring 
India’s Narcondam Island and Barren Island as base points, thus resulting in the line that 
lay in the southern part of the equidistant line. 
The case of Myanmar and India is an example of an agreed-upon maritime 
boundary in an area that still has a disputed island. This is one of the exceptions to the 
first hypothesis, which argues that disputes on resource-poor areas and clear base points 
will end in delimitation arrangements. The other exception to this hypothesis is the 
delimitation agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia on Natuna Sea that is known as 
a resource-rich area. Both exceptions are addressed in the next section after discussing 
the delimitation agreement in the Singapore Strait between Indonesia and Singapore. The 
latter is an example of a maritime boundary agreement that falls in a resource-poor area 
and has undisputed base points.    
B. INDONESIA–SINGAPORE AGREEMENTS IN THE SINGAPORE 
STRAIT 
In September 2014, Indonesia and Singapore signed their third agreement for 
maritime boundaries by signing a treaty to finalize another territorial sea border in the 
eastern part of Singapore Strait. This agreement followed the previous agreements, the 
1973 and 2009 Treaties, which completed both countries’ boundaries, but a segment in 
the Eastern Singapore Strait, which requires Malaysia to settle its boundary with 
Singapore first.70 From Indonesia’s perspective, the 2014 agreement marks Singapore as 
the only one of 10 countries that resolves all shared boundaries with Indonesia.71 
The first agreement between the two ASEAN countries took place in 1973, when 
Indonesia and Singapore agreed upon 24 miles of their territorial sea limits in the 
Singapore Strait. Six points were established in the center part of the Singapore Strait as 
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the connector of the territorial sea boundary. The line drawn did not adopt the equidistant 
principle, as Points 2 and 3 are closer to Indonesia’s side; the boundary follows the main 
route of deep-draft tankers (Figure 1).72 The delimitation in the strait had been a priority 
for both countries since it is a part of one of the world’s busiest straits. The flexibility of 
the delimitation method shows that both countries, particularly Indonesia which had 
“sacrificed” some portions of its territorial sea, were more concerned about safety of 
navigation than the extension of the territory.73 
Figure 1.  Indonesia-Singapore Maritime Delimitation 
in the Singapore Strait. 
       
Adapted from: I Made Andi Arsana, “Mapping a Good Fence with Singapore,” 
GeoPolitical Boundaries, February 10, 2009, https://geoboundaries.wordpress.com/ 
2009/02/10/mapping-a-good-fence-with-singapore/. 
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The agreement in 1973 left gaps in the Eastern and Western parts of the strait. Not 
until 36 years later did the two countries conclude their second agreement. On March 
2009, after 4 years of negotiations, Singapore and Indonesia agreed to delimit the western 
part of the Singapore Strait. The two Foreign Ministers, Indonesia’s Hassan Wirajuda and 
Singapore’s George Yeo signed an agreement that extends the 1973 delimitation 12.1 km 
farther westward. This delimitation leaves an uncertain portion of the western end, since 
it needs the involvement of Malaysia to determine a tri-junction point. The 2009 
agreement significantly resolved some issues that emerged between Indonesia and 
Singapore, particularly about Singapore land reclamation. The deal shows that Singapore 
abandoned its claim to use the reclaimed land as base points.74 Moreover, the use of 
Nipah Island by Indonesia as a base point preserved the status of the island as a legal base 
point, even though it was almost sunk in the high tide due to Singapore’s land 
reclamation program.75 Additionally, the 2009 treaty contributes to the anti-piracy efforts 
of both countries in the Singapore Strait. Both countries, together with Malaysia, have 
been involved since 2004in a counter-piracy coordinated patrol named MALSINDO or 
Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP).76 The established boundary will provide certainty for 
both navies in conducting patrols in their own territorial seas. 
The last territorial sea delimitation agreed upon by Indonesia and Singapore took 
place in 2014, when the two coastal states agreed to delimit their boundaries in the 
eastern part of the Singapore Strait. The effort of delimitating the eastern portion of the 
strait had been initiated by the two heads of government when Indonesian President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long met in the  
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14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand in 2009.77 Two years later, both representatives 
commenced technical discussions of the treaty in Singapore. Indonesia and Singapore 
finalized the deal in the final round of negotiations, in August 2014, in Medan, after 
conducting nine series of negotiations since 2011.78 The 5.1 nautical miles territorial 
maritime border lies between Changi and Batam marks an important achievement for 
both countries’ relations, as “[o]fficials and observers from both sides see it as a 
demonstration of how Indonesia and Singapore have been able to work together in areas 
of mutual interest.”79 However, the 2014 agreement leaves gaps in areas between Pedra 
Branca and Bintan Island since Singapore and Malaysia have not yet demarcated their 
maritime limits.  
1. Resource Factor 
As mentioned, the value of certain areas can be tangible or intangible. The 
Singapore Strait has a tangible value, as it, along with the Strait of Malacca, is one of the 
world’s most important straits, economically and strategically, and links the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans. More than 65,000 vessels transit the straits annually, connecting the 
major world’s economies such as Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and China.80 Though 
having a key economic value, the Singapore Strait lacks natural resources. No oil and gas 
fields lie in the areas, nor do potential ones. The dense shipping traffic in the areas and 
intensive industrialization contribute to marine pollution, thus causing the decline of  
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fishing activities in the Strait.81 The traffic in the Singapore Strait also inhibits fishermen 
from conducting their activities. Instead of the narrow Singapore Strait, fishing activities 
take place in the Strait of Malacca and Johor Straits. These facts explain how the 
economic value of the Singapore Strait drives from shipping activities.   
2. Baselines 
The three maritime delimitation agreements between Indonesia and Singapore are 
drawn from clear baselines inherited from the British and Dutch colonial powers. These 
two dominant powers in Southeast Asia established their colonies in both the mainland 
and the archipelago. Initially, the British and the Dutch had overlapping claims in some 
regions of the archipelago. The competition between the two European countries dated to 
the 1800s when Thomas Stamford Raffles transformed Singapore into a major port in the 
region. The development of Singapore threatened Netherland’s Batavia, which was 
aggravated by Raffles’ provocation to establish a trade network with Aceh and other 
cities in Sumatera. This issue caught the attention of the two countries’ leaders, Willem II 
and King George, who then compromised. Great Britain and the Netherlands revised the 
1814 London Treaty, or Anglo-Dutch Treaty, in 1824. The treaty ruled territorial, 
commercial, and financial arrangements that led to the establishment of the British 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.82 In the territorial aspect, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty 
arranged the territory of the two countries, in which any island south of the Strait of 
Malacca and Singapore belonged to the Dutch, whereas the northern part of the strait 
became British-owned. The Netherlands acknowledged British occupation of Singapore 
and relinquished Malacca to the British. The British, on the other side, gave all of its 
colonies in Sumatera to the Dutch.83  
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Indonesia and Singapore refer to the Anglo-Dutch treaty in defining their 
territory. All offshore small islands have never been objects of dispute between the two 
countries. The Anglo-Dutch treaty does not depict the details of the territory on the map; 
it only mentions that the Dutch owns everything south of the Strait of Singapore. Article 
XII of the treaty states, “His Britannick Majesty, however, engages, that no British 
Establishment shall be made on the Carimon Isles, or on the Island of Bantam, Bintang, 
Lingin, or on any of the other Islands South of the Straits of Singapore, nor any Treaty 
concluded by British Authority with the Chiefs of those Islands.”84 This statement is 
enough to make all offshore islands located in the Singapore Strait inheritances of the 
colonial powers, which became the basis of defining the territory.  
Indonesia and Singapore use their own baselines to agree upon their maritime 
boundaries. As an archipelagic country, Indonesia uses Karimun Kecil Island, Nipah 
Island, Pelampong Island, Helen Mars Rock, Benteng Rock, Berhanti Stone, and Nongsa 
Island as base points.85 These base points make baselines as the foundation for 
determining the maritime territorial boundaries with Singapore. Singapore uses its normal 
baselines, which lies along the mainland, to determine the maritime borders.     
3. Political Considerations 
The three agreements between Indonesia and Singapore also reflect political 
considerations. The first maritime agreement was negotiated during the period of 
Indonesia’s campaign to claim its concept of Wawasan Nusantara, or the Indonesian 
Archipelagic Vision. Wawasan Nusantara is the fundamental principle of Indonesian 
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and varied cultural backgrounds. To unite the thousands of islands, the Indonesian  
government declared the concept of the archipelagic state through the Djuanda 
Declaration in December 13, 1957. The declaration stated that all waters surrounding and 
between the islands were included in Indonesian territory. This new concept challenged 
the notion of the “freedom of the sea.”86 Since then, Indonesia has tried to introduce the 
concept of the archipelagic state to the international community. 
This effort included promoting the Djuanda Declaration in the Convention of the 
Law on the Sea as well as actively negotiating maritime boundaries with neighboring 
countries. The first endeavor has managed to bring the Convention to accept the concept 
of an archipelagic state, as stated in the provision of Article 47 of the UNCLOS 1982. 
This success led to the agreement of several maritime borders. As shown in Table 2, from 
1969 to 1982, Indonesia delimited more maritime boundaries than any other country in 
Southeast Asia. It concluded 14 out of 18 maritime agreements prior to 1982. In doing so, 
Indonesia often sacrificed the ideal conditions of the delimitations during the 
negotiations. The 1973 agreement with Singapore demonstrates that Indonesia allowed 
the agreed-upon line to encroach on Indonesia’s archipelagic baselines. The tendency to 
give up some portion of “its” waters to gain support for the archipelagic concept is also 
indicated in Indonesia’s other agreements. The 1969 agreement with Malaysia, the 1971 
trilateral agreement with Thailand and Malaysia, the 1972 agreement with Australia, and 
the 1978 trilateral agreement with India and Thailand confirm similar behavior, when 
Indonesia accepted the principle of non-equidistance in determining maritime boundaries 
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The second and third agreements were concluded during the terms of President 
Yudhoyono. These two agreements demonstrated a new trend in maritime dispute 
settlements. Unlike the other agreements, the 2009 and 2014 agreements had been  
concluded in a relatively short time. The negotiation for the 2009 agreement took place in 
2005, whereas the first talks for the latter was conducted five years prior to the 
agreement. Both countries could arrange new agreements due to the political will of their  
leaders, especially on Indonesia’s side. President Yudhoyono was famous for his foreign 
policy of “thousand friends zero enemy.” During his presidency, Indonesia sought active 
roles in foreign affairs, including the dispute settlement. The fact that the first talks for 
the 2009 treaty commenced in Yudhoyono’s early terms and the second were agreed 
upon just before the end of his presidency reveals that political will matters for the two 
treaties Indonesia and Singapore signed.  
C. THE EXCEPTIONS  
Most maritime disputes that ended in delimitation arrangements concerned 
resource-poor waters with clear island status. However, two cases out of 30 maritime 
agreements in Southeast Asia were agreed-upon resource-rich waters or disputed islands. 
The two cases were between Burma and India in 1986 when they signed an agreement 
delimitating their maritime boundaries in the Andaman Sea and the 1969 Agreement 
between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Natuna Sea. Burma’s claim of Narcondam Island, 
east of India’s Andaman Islands, complicated the first agreement. The second was about 
continental shelf delimitation on oil-and-gas-rich areas. 
1. Burma-India Agreement in the Andaman Sea 
The agreement between Burma (now Myanmar) and India in the Andaman Sea 
was initially seen as a complicated problem. One of those complicated reasons concerned 






considered part of the Andaman Islands. Narcondam lies 140 km east of the North 
Andaman and has an area of 6.8 square kilometers. Burma claimed this island along with  
Barren Island, south of Narcondam, and even attempted to occupy Narcondam Island in 
1984, which failed.87 The other factor that made the agreement hard to achieve was  
Burma’s insistence in using straight baselines that cut off the Gulf of Martaban which 
connects Irrawadi Delta to Moscos Island, claimed by Burma in 1968 (Figure 2).88 India 
objected to these uncommon Burma baselines being used to generate an equidistant line.  
The disputes over Narcondam Island and Burma’s claimed baselines made the 
negotiation process over the maritime boundary difficult to reach. Eleven years after 
commencing talks in 1976, India and Burma eventually signed the agreement. Both 
parties resolved the disputes peacefully after making certain compromises in the 
agreement (Figure 2). First, Burma relinquished its claim over Narcondam Island in 
exchange for the exclusion of the island as a base point to determine the maritime 
boundary. Second, the agreed-upon boundary did not use Burma’s straight baselines that 
crossed the Gulf of Martaban. Having sovereignty over Narcondam Island, India had to 
agree that the non-equidistant method be used, in Burma’s favor. This method gave 
Burma approximately 625 square nautical miles more than it should have obtained from 
the equidistant method.89 
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Figure 2.  Burma and India 1986 Maritime Boundary Agreement 
 
Adapted from: Jonathan I. Charney et al., eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 2 
(Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1993) and Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in Southeast Asia: A 
Commentary and Map (Honolulu: East-West Environment and Policy Institute, 1981)  
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2. Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement in the Natuna Sea 
The Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement contains three separate lines, dividing the 
continental shelf of Indonesia and Malaysia in the Strait of Malacca and the Natuna Sea 
(Figure 3). The two continental shelf borders are located around the Natuna Islands, areas 
well known for their oil and gas deposits. An Italian oil company, Agip, first discovered 
the Natuna gas field in 1970.90 It is the biggest field in Southeast Asia with the estimate 
of gas deposits reaching 46 trillion cubic feet.91 It was not until 1980, however, that the 
Indonesian state-owned company Pertamina conducted the first exploitation. The oil and 
gas field spreads over both eastern and western Natuna Islands, which now became an 
important source of natural resources for both Indonesia and Malaysia. The present oil 
and gas field maps show exploitation projects conducted by the two countries’ companies 
around the agreed-upon borders. The agreement demonstrates that a peaceful settlement 
through bilateral negotiations could also be accomplished in resource-rich areas like in 
Natuna Sea. 
The reasons such an agreement happened was a matter of timing. Indonesia and 
Malaysia agreed to the continental shelf limit just before the discovery of potential oil 
and gas reserves in the areas. At the time of the negotiation, both countries did not factor 
economics as the main consideration for determining the boundaries. In addition, the 
negotiation process took place during a period when Indonesia needed to protect its 
archipelagic concept by establishing as many maritime boundaries as possible with 
neighboring countries. This motivation is obvious when observing the third continental 
shelf limit drawn from the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia land boundary in Borneo Island 
northward to the Natuna Sea. That continental shelf line encroached westward from the 
equidistant line in favor of Malaysia (Figure 3). In this case, the Suharto administration 
gave up some portion of its waters to achieve the broader goal: the Natuna Sea. 
                                                 




Figure 3.  Indonesia and Malaysia Maritime Boundaries 
 
Adapted from: Jonathan I. Charney et al., eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 1 
(Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1993). 
D. SUMMARY 
Most maritime delimitation agreements in Southeast Asia solve maritime disputes 
that are located in resource-poor waters and are drawn from clear islands or coastlines. 
Currently, 30 delimitation agreements in Southeast Asian waters have been concluded 
among ASEAN members as well as with neighboring countries; 28 of them are 
agreements of maritime boundaries in resource-poor waters and with clear baselines. 
Many of those agreements use a modified equidistant line to determine the boundary. It 
means that maritime boundaries are negotiable and flexible. The best example of 
agreements over resource-limited areas and clear baselines is the Indonesia and 
Singapore agreement concerning the Singapore Strait. 
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Indonesia and Singapore have three agreements regarding the Singapore Strait. 
The first agreement, signed in 1973, divided the two states’ territorial sea in the center of 
the Singapore Strait. The last two agreements, made in 2009 and in 2014, extended the 
existing border westward and eastward. The negotiations ran smoothly because the issue 
lacked an economic interest, particularly the existence of natural resources in the areas. 
The economic significance of the strait is simply its strategic location; it is used for main 
shipping routes connecting East Asia and the Middle East. The two countries do not 
dispute any island in the Singapore Strait that they inherited from colonial powers. The 
absence of natural resources and the clear land status to determine the boundary makes 
peaceful talks likely to happen. In addition, the prompt progress of negotiation was 
supported by conducive political events and political will.  
The only two exceptions to the general pattern of delimitation arrangements are 
the agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia in oil/gas-rich areas and the agreement 
between Burma and India in the waters around a disputed Narcondam Island in the 
Andaman Sea. The first case did not end in disputes because the gas field was not 
discovered until 1970, a year after the agreement. Moreover, Indonesia’s tendency to 
concede some portions of waters off northern Borneo’s West Coast gained support for 
archipelagic ideas, expediting the negotiations. The next case that demonstrates the 
possibility of peaceful talks resulted in the delimitation of a maritime boundary around a 
disputed island. Burma and India resolved the dispute by making some concessions, 
where the former acknowledged the sovereignty of Narcondam Island to India, and the 
latter gave up some portions of waters to Myanmar in return for the island.  
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III. JOINT-DEVELOPMENT AS A PROVISIONAL MEASURE 
FOR MARITIME DISPUTES 
This chapter will discuss another peaceful outcome for maritime boundary 
disputes in Southeast Asia. Different from delimitation arrangements, joint-development 
exploits the sea for the benefit of disputing parties in a provisional agreement. Many 
countries in the world have practiced joint-development as an alternative to resolving 
disputes over their maritime boundaries. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain established the very 
first joint-development in 1958, when Bahrain’s rulers agreed to drop their claim over the 
Fasht Abu-Safa oilfield in return for shared revenue from Saudi Arabia’s exploration.92 
Since then, subsequent joint-development agreements have sprung up worldwide in 
various models.  
Joint-development is widely seen as a provisional measure mandated by the 
UNCLOS. The UNCLOS does not state explicitly the obligation to manage disputes 
through joint development as an option if the delimitation arrangement is difficult to 
achieve; however, it does mandate that the disputing countries pursue a temporary 
solution in a situation in which no parties reach agreement in disputes about overlapping 
EEZ and continental shelf claims. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the UNCLOS state that 
“the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this 
transition period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.”93 
Provisional arrangements stated by these articles may take different forms, such as a 
moratorium on all activities in the disputed areas and joint development of fisheries and 
hydrocarbon resources in those areas.94 The way the UNCLOS uses the word 
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“provisional” means that such an arrangement is temporary in nature. The disputants 
cannot gain sovereignty over features in the surrounding waters as a result of such 
provisional agreements.95    
The UNCLOS articles encourage Southeast Asian nations to adopt joint-
development options for some unresolved maritime disputes in Southeast Asia. Seven 
joint-development agreements have been established in Southeast Asian waters to date: 
four in the Gulf of Thailand, two in the Timor Gap, and one in the southern South China 
Sea. All of the locations are resource-rich areas without sovereignty problems over 
islands or other maritime features. It suggests that in Southeast Asia, joint development is 
the most common outcome when sovereignty disputes are few and natural resources are 
abundant. This chapter also finds that the political will of the respective governments and 
the involvement in a regional organization like ASEAN could encourage the disputant 
countries to select a joint-development option. This chapter will first review joint-
development cases practiced in Southeast Asia waters. Then, as a case study, it will 
discuss the situation in the Gulf of Thailand, particularly the experience of Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam in agreeing to joint development agreements for their disputed 
waters. 
A. JOINT DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
In Southeast Asia, various models of joint-development in the disputed waters 
have been practiced for decades. David M. Ong classifies joint-development into three 
different models: 1) One country exploits other country’s oilfield and shares the revenue, 
2) The disputing states adopt compulsory unification and joint ventures to exploit shared 
resources, and 3) The related parties establish an institutional framework to promote 
cooperation in exploiting shared deposits.96 Table 3 summarizes all joint-development 
practices established by Southeast Asian countries. It shows that the agreed-upon joint 
developments did not share the same scheme; instead, they adopted all three of Ong’s 
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classification. Most of the parties enjoyed economic benefits from such arrangements, as 
the multinational companies could freely extract natural resources in the agreed-upon 
area without fear of intimidation. In contrast, some of the agreements have not progressed 
well. The Cambodia-Thailand agreement and the tripartite agreement between Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam are examples of how the agreement for joint development is not 
the only precondition to develop the areas. It also requires total commitment and 
cooperation from all the involved parties and conducive inter-state relations.    
Table 3.   Joint Developments in Southeast Asia 
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Exploitation is conducted by contractors 
with exploitation rights from the Joint 
Commission, as approved by the 
Ministerial Council. Revenue sharing: 90% 








Commercial Arrangement Area-revenue 
sharing. Malaysia’s Petronas conducted 
joint-exploration with the Brunei National 
Petroleum Company in Brunei’s maritime 
areas.   
1 
Adapted from: David M. Ong, “Implications of Recent Southeast Asian State Practice for the 
International Law on Offshore Joint Development,” n.d., http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/Session-5-David-Ong-JD-SEAsianStatePractice-Jun111-pdf.pdf. 
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The pioneers of joint-development in the region are Thailand and Malaysia. Both 
countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the delimitation of the continental 
shelf boundary in 1979. This memorandum defined an overlapping area that requires the 
establishment of a joint-authority to exploit natural resources, even though the body was 
only established in 1990.97 The overlapping area was defined as the Malaysia-Thailand 
Joint Development Area (MTJDA) situated in the southeastern part of the Gulf of 
Thailand. It is a location of abundant buried hydrocarbon reserves with an estimated 9.5 
trillion cubic feet of proved and probable natural gas.98 No sovereignty disputes between 
Malaysia and Thailand existed in the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula where both 
countries share territorial borders. The absence of a sovereignty issue around the MTJDA 
discouraged both countries from asserting a continental shelf claim, which resulted in the 
agreement to jointly exploit the area.  
In 1989, Indonesia and Australia created a zone of cooperation in an area known 
as the Timor Gap, which is famous for its abundant natural gas reserves. The area is 
believed to have 5 billion barrels of oil that make it the world’s 23rd largest oil deposit.99 
The Timor Gap also contains an estimated 50 trillion cubic feet of liquid natural gas 
(LNG).100 East Timor renewed this agreement by signing a memorandum with Australia 
immediately after East Timor’s independence in 2002.101 Similar to the MTJDA, the 
Timor Gap had no sovereignty issues contested by Australia and Indonesia, and later East 
Timor. The area was left undelimited when Australia and Indonesia agreed on their 
seabed boundaries in 1972. At that time, Portugal, as the official administrative power in 
East Timor, did not become involved in the same discussion with Australia and Indonesia 
regarding the seabed boundaries. After East Timor’s integration with Indonesia in 1975, 
Indonesia and Australia started to discuss the possibility of joint cooperation, which did 
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not conclude until 1989. This case demonstrates that the joint-development concept is 
favorable for countries in managing disputes in the areas that contain significant natural 
resources and are free of sovereignty disputes. 
Vietnam followed Thailand in making a provisional arrangement with Malaysia 
for petroleum deposit exploration in 1992 in the Gulf of Thailand. The agreed-upon area 
is bordered with the one discussed in the 1979 Malaysia-Thailand MoU. The Malaysia-
Vietnam coincided area, known as the Defined Area (DA), lies over the Malay Basin, a 
source of oil and natural gas. The area was reported to have 1.1 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas and capable of producing 4,400 barrels of oil per day.102 No sovereignty 
issues prevented both countries from embarking on such agreements since Malaysia and 
Vietnam do not directly border each other; their mainland is separated by 200 nautical 
miles. The two countries only disputed continental shelf boundaries as a result of 
unilateral claims that did not result from bilateral negotiations. The 1992 agreement, 
however, overlapped with the Malaysia-Thailand agreement, thus required trilateral 
communication to address the issue. Seven years later, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
agreed upon a joint-development principle in the intersected area.103 Like the previous 
agreements, no countries contested sovereignty disputes in the area by the time they 
signed the agreement.   
Cambodia started to define its maritime boundary following the reintegration into 
the international community by negotiating its continental shelf claim with Thailand. The 
area contested by Cambodia and Thailand lay in the northern part of the Gulf of Thailand, 
encompassing three sources of oil and natural gas: the Kra Basin, Thai Basin, and Pattani 
Basin. An estimated 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and minor oil reserves lies in 
those basins.104 The continental shelf claims of both countries did not involve 
sovereignty disputes over islands or maritime features, since the 1907 Franco-Siamese 
Treaty clearly stated that France, Cambodia’s former colonial power, had agreed to cede 
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Koh Kut Island and all of the northern islands to Siam.105 The only problem disputed by 
the two countries was the basepoint to determine maritime zones. Cambodia and 
Thailand interpreted one of the clauses in the treaty differently. The treaty says that “the 
frontier between the French Indo-China and Siam starts at a point that is located at a point 
opposite the highest point of the Koh Kut Island” (my translation).106 Thailand argued 
that the treaty only rules the land boundary and has nothing to do to determine the sea 
boundary in the strait that separates the mainland and Koh Kut Island.107 Cambodia, on 
the other hand, interpreted the clause in the treaty as also defining the maritime boundary 
between Koh Kut and the mainland. Cambodia draws its continental shelf line from the 
Thai-Cambodian border in the mainland and crosses Koh Kut Island, “leaving the 
southern part of the island without a Thai territorial sea or an EEZ area.”108 Figure 1 
shows the different interpretations of Thailand and Cambodia regarding the clause. 
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Figure 4.  Cambodia and Thailand Different Perspectives  
Concerning Koh Kut Island. 
 
Source: Victor Prescott and Clive Howard Schofield, Undelimited Maritime Boundaries 
of the Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean, Maritime Briefing 3, 1 (Durham: IBRU, 2001), 12. 
Both governments eventually engaged in commence negotiations to solve their 
maritime problems. During the negotiations, each country differed in determining the 
final solution. Thailand favored a delimitation arrangement, while Cambodia insisted on 
a joint-development solution for the contested waters.109 Despite sharp differences, in 
2001 both countries finally concluded a memorandum of understanding on their 
overlapping claims. This agreement was seen as a good deal for both countries as it 
accommodated each preference. The MoU divided the area into northern and southern 
areas along the 11° latitude line, where Cambodia and Thailand would seek delimitation 
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on the northern part and joint-development for the southern one.110 No further report is 
available regarding why they determined the 11° latitude as the distinction line dividing 
the overlapping claims. The most plausible reason is that the southern part of that line 
contains more natural resources than the northern part, as proven by Thailand with its 
exploration works in the southern area. The MoU represents a good sign that Thailand 
and Cambodia will cooperate in their overlapping claims. Nevertheless, no significant 
progress had been realized by the two countries as a result of sour relations between them 
due to various issues.111  
Several unrelated issues hampered the implementation of the MoU. In 2003, the 
follow-up discussions of joint development faded out as a result of the increased tension 
between both countries following the burning of the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh.112 
The riots were caused by national sentiment that flared after a statement by a Thai actress 
who alleged that Cambodia’s Angkor Wat Temple belonged to Thailand. The dispute 
over the Preah Vihear temple in 2008 and unstable Thai domestic politics in that period 
further delayed the negotiation. In 2009, Thailand even wanted to cancel the MoU as a 
protest against the appointment of the Thai former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as 
a Cambodian economic advisor.113 The Thai government later decided to continue  
respecting the MoU as the relations were restored.114 The experience of Thailand and 
Cambodia shows the importance of political dynamics in influencing maritime issue 
development. 
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The most recent joint-development initiative happened in the South China Sea 
when, in 2009, Brunei and Malaysia agreed upon a commercial joint-arrangement area 
(CJAA). Under the British protectorate, the Sultanate of Brunei claimed its continental 
shelf seaward up to 265 nautical miles from the shores in 1954.115 The relations between 
the sultanate and Malaysia were calm until the publication of the 1979 Malaysian New 
Map, which encompassed Brunei’s continental shelf. The area became a source of 
contention as Malaysia claimed the possession of oil-rich Blok L and Block M. The 
overlapping claims of the two countries did not a result from sovereignty disputes over 
offshore islands. Malaysia’s claim arose from historical facts116 while Brunei laid its 
claim on the law of the sea. There was actually a dispute about the sovereignty of 
Limbang, a Malaysian small district that separates Brunei territories into two separated 
areas: the Brunei-Muara, Tutong, and Belait districts in the west and the Temburong 
district in the east. However, Brunei’s claim over Limbang was not related to the 
continental shelf claims, but had an indirect relationship on the conclusion of the 
maritime disputes. The two sovereign states defended each continental shelf claim until 
2009. 
Brunei and Malaysia ended their disputes over the overlapping continental shelf 
in the South China Sea on March 16, 2009 following an exchange of letters between the 
respective governments.117 This agreement concluded two stages of negotiations held in 
1997, and from 2003 to 2008.118 In an official statement, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that “Malaysia and Brunei . . . agreed to establish a final 
and permanent sea boundary.”119 The statement acknowledges the sovereignty of Brunei 
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over the continental shelf previously claimed by Malaysia.120 Moreover, the agreement 
includes “a commercial arrangement under which Malaysia will be allowed to participate 
on a commercial basis, to jointly develop the oil and gas resources in this area for a 
period of 40 years.”121 The joint-development arrangement adopts Ong’s third model, in 
which Malaysia has rights to drill in areas that belong to Brunei. 
Both countries could agree on the CJAA because no sovereignty dispute related to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf, and because the area held an estimated 1 billion 
barrels of oil.122 Moreover, the 2009 agreement seems to be a win-win solution for both 
countries, as Brunei gave up its claim over Limbang to Malaysia.123 In this case, the 2009 
exchange of letters confirmed that the sovereignty of Limbang belonged to Malaysia and 
that the sovereignty in the maritime parts belonged to Brunei.  
This brief discussion of several joint-development arrangements in Southeast Asia 
provides a basic background in how Southeast Asian countries could agree on joint 
development in unresolved maritime border disputes. It is common in Southeast Asia that 
the disputed resource-rich areas can be exploited before agreeing on maritime borders 
through an interim agreement.  This section identifies that countries would choose joint-
development arrangements in maritime disputes over resource-rich areas that are free 
from sovereignty disputes over islands or other maritime features. This finding will be 
examined in more depth in a discussion of case studies in the Gulf of Thailand. The next 
section will discuss joint-development agreements established by Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. These case studies demonstrate that the states could agree upon a form of 
joint-exploitation as a reasonable resolution to overlapping claims.124  
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B. JOINT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF OF THAILAND 
The Gulf of Thailand, historically known as the Gulf of Siam, is one of the most 
complicated waters in Southeast Asia due to overlapping claims by the coastal states. The 
Gulf of Thailand is an area that lies between Mui Ca Mau, the southern tip of mainland 
Vietnam, and the Malaysian coast near Kota Bharu. The gulf encompasses an area of 
approximately 283,700 square kilometers, whose shores are shared by four ASEAN 
members: Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.125 Based on UNCLOS, these 
states have rights to claim EEZs up to 200 nautical miles126 and continental shelves up to 
260 nautical miles from their coastlines or baselines.127 However, the Gulf of Thailand’s 
average width itself is just 215 nautical miles, which makes the gulf subject to 
overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims.128 Moreover, the presence of hydrocarbon 
reserves encourages the coastal states to make their own claims on the EEZ and 
continental shelves, which hinders agreement on clear maritime boundaries. Several 
major basins that contain abundant oil and gas reserves are known to be located in the 
Gulf of Thailand, such as the Chumphon Basin, the Western Basin, the Malay Basin, the 
Pattani Basin, and the Thai Basin, with the estimated sediment thickness from 1,000 to 
4,000 meters, a positive sign for potential hydrocarbon reserves.129 Among those basins, 
the Malay and Thai basins are known for gas deposits, which lie at the center of the Gulf 
of Thailand, an area with the most overlapping claims. The Thai basin’s natural gas 
production capacity is 200 million ft3 per day and the estimated reserves are 8 trillion 
ft3.130  
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Table 4 shows the summary of continental shelf and EEZ claims in the Gulf of 
Thailand. Among those overlapping claims, two cases ended up in joint developments 
and proved to be effective in extracting oil and natural gas. The next paragraphs will 
discuss those two joint developments, the Malaysia-Thailand JDA and the Malaysia-
Vietnam DA, as case studies. 
Table 4.   Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
Disputed countries Km2
Cambodia-South Vietnam 50,000 
Cambodia-Thailand 19,900 
South Vietnam-Thailand 800 




Adapted from: Victor Prescott, The Gulf of Thailand: Maritime Limits to Conflict and 
Cooperation (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1998), 16 
1. Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam Overlapping Claims 
Thailand first claimed its maritime sovereignty in 1958 when it defined straight 
baselines along the Bay of Bangkok, which it claimed as an historic bay.131 In 1970, 
Thailand announced its other baselines in three segments, of which two were located on 
the eastern and western sides of the Gulf of Thailand. The 1970 claim unified Thailand’s 
small islands within the baselines. On the eastern coast of the gulf, the baseline started 
from the terminus of the land boundary with Cambodia and continued to link Ko Kut 
Island, Ko Chang Island, and other small islands. In 1973, Thailand claimed the 
continental shelf, in which the line elongated from the terminus of the land border with 
Malaysia to the terminus of Thailand’s land border with Cambodia. Thailand’s 
continental shelf claim was subject to dispute because it went beyond the median line 
with other neighbors.132 No sovereignty disputes related to the Thailand’s continental 
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shelf claim existed at the time it was announced. All of the baselines that generated 
continental shelf lines were drawn from Thailand’s own islands that had no sovereignty 
issues. The only exception was a base point located in Koh Kut Island that was disputed 
by Cambodia as discussed in the previous section.  
Vietnam, previously South Vietnam, introduced its continental shelf boundary in 
the gulf on June 9, 1971. Prescott perceives Vietnam’s claim as ambitious because it 
engulfed some of Cambodia’s islands, including the ones close to Cambodian shores, and 
Poulo Wai Island, located 53 nautical miles off Cambodia’s mainland.133 The claim by 
Vietnam seemed to be a response to Thailand’s aggressive maneuver in natural resources 
exploration, especially after Thailand issued Law No. 2514 on Petroleum on March 26, 
1971, which caused a boom in offshore petroleum development.134 After the fall of South 
Vietnam, the government of Vietnam asserted the claim by filing an official statement 
regarding its maritime regimes to the UNCLOS in 1977. The statement provides a legal 
basis for Vietnam’s maritime claims. It states, “The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
exercises sovereign rights over the Vietnamese continental shelf,” and all disputes arising 
from Vietnamese claims “will be dealt . . . in accordance with the principle of defending 
the sovereignty and interests of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.”135 After that, 
Vietnam maintained its continental shelf claim in the Gulf of Thailand until the 
agreement with Malaysia in 1992. Vietnam had no disputed islands with Malaysia and 
Thailand when it declared its continental shelf. One sovereignty dispute related to 
Vietnam’s overlapping claims was the sovereignty issue of Phu Quoc Island, which 
caused overlapping claims with Cambodia.   
Malaysia’s first claim of continental shelf was announced in 1966 through the 
Malaysia Continental Shelf Act 1966. At that time, the Act defined the continental shelf 
as:  
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The sea-bed and subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coast of 
Malaysia but beyond the limits of the territorial waters of the States, the 
surface of which lies at a depth no greater than two hundred meters below 
the surface of the sea, or, where the depth of the superadjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, at any 
greater depth.136  
The Malaysian government created the Act after the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
went into force in June 1964, in which Malaysia was one the participants. At that time, 
the claim was unclear since the convention did not mention a specific distance from the 
coastline to determine country’s continental shelf. Malaysia demonstrated a more 
systematic effort to define its continental shelf limit when it published the New Map in 
1979. The New Map has been a source of territorial dispute with eight neighboring 
countries, including Thailand and Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand. The publication of the 
New Map was primarily Malaysia’s unilateral claim without preliminary discussions with 
neighboring countries. Such action was against “ASEAN’s principle of mutual respect 
and the ASEAN spirit of cooperation, which should have entailed discussions or 
exchange of views” before publishing something that could lead to conflict.137 With 
Thailand, Malaysia stretched its continental shelf without considering Ko Losin as 
Thailand’s basepoint (Figure 5). Malaysia also ignored the presence of Vietnam’s 
southern offshore islands in determining the continental shelf, resulting in an area 
overlapping Vietnam’s claim. The continental shelf limit only accounted for Mui Ca 
Mau, the southern tip of Vietnam’s mainland, as a basis to define equidistant lines. 
Malaysia’s continental shelf claims had nothing to do with any sovereignty disputes, but 
only reflected their effort to extract as many benefits as possible from the claimed 
continental shelves. 
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Figure 5.  Overlapping Maritime Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
 
For illustrative purposes only; drawing is not to scale. Adapted from: J. R. V. Prescott, 
The Gulf of Thailand: Maritime Limits to Conflict and Cooperation (Kuala Lumpur: 
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1998) 
 52
2.  The Malaysia-Thailand Joint-Development Area (MTJDA) 
Thailand’s extensive oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Thailand in the 1970s 
triggered the decision to embark on the joint-development agreement. Thailand was the 
first coastal country in the Gulf of Thailand to conduct resource exploration. Thailand’s 
government conducted the first offshore exploration after enacting the 1971 Petroleum 
Act. Prior to the exploration, the Thai government had granted exploration rights to six 
international oil companies for petroleum in 17 blocks in the Gulf of Thailand.138 The 
first offshore drilling was conducted by Union in the Pattani Basin in 1973.139 Besides 
Pattani Basin, Thailand knew that the Malay Basin also contained promising natural 
resources and planned to go south for further exploration. Nonetheless, Malaysia’s claim 
hampered Thailand’s intention to expand southward. Malaysia’s continental shelf claim 
encroached on Thailand’s because the 1979 New Map ignored Thailand’s straight 
baselines that utilized Ko Losin and Ko Kra, islands off Thailand’s eastern coast, as 
basepoints. Malaysia did that because Thailand only defined its baselines in 1992 based 
on basepoints located in those islands.140 It did not mean that Malaysia contested the 
sovereignty of Ko Losin and Ko Kra. The sovereignty status of offshore islands east of 
the peninsula was settled through the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, which defined the 
possession of small islands off the Eastern Coast of the Peninsula clearly. The treaty says 
that all islands that lay “south of the parallel of latitude drawn from the point where the 
Sungei Golok reaches the coast . . . shall be transferred to Great Britain, and all islands to 
the north of that parallel shall remain to Siam.”141 This article was never challenged by 
Malaysia thus making the area free of sovereignty disputes at the time Malaysia and 
Thailand agreed on joint development. 
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Malaysia and Thailand signed the MoU of joint development in February 1979. 
Both countries agreed on jointly developing the overlapped area of 7,250 square 
kilometers, which was known as the MTJDA. Initially, no progress had been made by the 
two countries following the MoU. The two countries only created the Malaysia-Thailand 
Joint Authority (MTJA) on May 1990. The body headquartered in Kuala Lumpur with 
the primary function of managing the MTJDA. The 1990 agreement was to apply the 
1979 MoU between the two countries that mandated the establishment of a “‘Joint 
Authority’. . . for the purpose of the exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil in the overlapping area.”142 The MTJA awarded the 
first production sharing contract (PSC) in 1994 to two groups of contractors, which 
eventually got their first gas 2005.143  
The MTJDA operates under the MTJA, a joint institution created to control “all 
exploration and exploitation” in the MTJDA, including the awarding of exploration 
rights.144 The MTJDA itself is located in the North Malay Basin, a gas- and oil-rich area 
that has sediment thickness of more than 8 km.145 To date, 72 exploration and appraisal 
wells have been drilled, 27 gas fields have been declared, and 217 development wells 
have been drilled in the MTJDA.146 All of them are spread in three different blocks: A-
18, B-17, and C-19. Initial production in block A-18 resulted in 390 million cubic feet per 
day of natural gas and the second phase of exploitation yielded 400 million cubic feet per 
day of gas supply.147 The first exploitation in Block B-17 happened in 2009 with a 
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capacity of 270 million cubic feet per day of gas.148 These results demonstrate how rich 
the MTJDA is in natural resources. 
3. The Malaysia-Vietnam Defined Area (DA) 
In 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam agreed to a similar joint-development 
arrangement to the Malaysia-Thailand mode for the purpose of exploiting petroleum 
resources for the mutual benefit of disputing parties. Malaysia and Vietnam had a total of 
2,500 square kilometers overlapping continental shelves in the Gulf of Thailand. The 
overlapping claims arose from uncoordinated unilateral claims of both countries. 
Malaysia measured its continental shelf outer limits from its coast without considering 
Vietnam’s Hon Khoai Island, which was used as basepoint by Vietnam (Figure 2). On the 
other hand, Vietnam generated its continental shelf from Hon Khoai Island. This resulted 
in a long (more than 100 miles) but narrow (less than 10 miles) overlapping area which 
was known as the DA.149 The overlapping claims were then merely a matter of the law of 
the sea interpretation rather than sovereignty issues. Malaysia and Vietnam do not border 
each other as they are separated by the mouth of the Gulf of Thailand 200 nautical miles 
away. 
The effort to approach joint development as a solution for the overlapping claims 
first began in May 1991 when Vietnam protested Malaysian exploration activity in the 
area.150 The disputed area lay on the east of the MTJDA, also in the Malay Basin, which 
was considered to be a resource-rich area. In the height of the disputes, Malaysia granted 
three concessions to foreign companies. Both countries started to discuss the possibility 
of joint development after the announcement by Hamilton, one of operators, that a test 
conducted in one of the oil wells in the disputing area pumped an average of 4,400 
barrels of oil per day.151 Intense bilateral negotiations finally reached an agreement of 
joint development in the disputed area. In the MoU, both parties agreed to cooperate in a 
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joint-venture model and nominated Petronas and Petrovietnam in take charge of 
exploration and exploitation in the DA.152 This arrangement did not obligate Malaysia 
and Vietnam from establishing a joint authority as in the Malaysia-Thailand agreement. 
While Malaysia and Thailand needed 15 years to realize the 1979 MoU, Malaysia-
Vietnam cooperation needed only four years to extract the first oil from the Bunga 
Kekwa field.153 The Malaysia-Vietnam model had demonstrated better progress than the 
MTJDA because the arrangement was much simpler, as it was more flexible for the 
companies to conduct any exploration or exploitation 
C. SUMMARY 
When countries do not agree on maritime delimitation in resource-rich areas, they 
can establish joint-development arrangement as a temporary solution. The UNCLOS 
addresses the adoption of joint development as a provisional arrangement, which has 
been practiced in many cases around the world. In Southeast Asia, two factors offer 
strong incentives for the disputed countries to compromise on a form of joint-
development: resource-rich areas and undisputed islands and/or maritime features. All 
joint-development practices in Southeast Asia take place in areas without disputed land 
territory and abundant natural resources. The situations in the Gulf of Thailand provide 
good examples of how the contesting states will agree on joint-development in disputed 
waters that conform to these two variables. Another factor that influences a country to 
adopt joint development is good bilateral relations with the other country. What was 
experienced by Cambodia and Thailand regarding their joint-development arrangement 
shows that conducive bilateral relations are the principle necessity for the joint 
development to progress. Finally, the case study of the Gulf of Thailand can show other 
regions in Southeast Asia that peaceful resolution can be achieved through a provisional 
agreement if the disputing parties cannot reach permanent bilateral agreement. 
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IV. THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT 
Third-party settlement through the international organization is a new trend for 
Southeast Asian countries to resolve their disputes with neighbors. However, for the 
countries in this region, especially for the ASEAN members, resolving disputes through 
the international organization is not preferable. ASEAN, through the ASEAN Charter, 
mandates its members to resolve the disputes “through dialogue, consultation, and 
negotiation.”154 Further, the Charter states that unresolved disputes should be brought to 
the ASEAN Summit, meaning that the disputes should be resolved internally, within the 
frame of ASEAN.155 Such norms do not prevent ASEAN members from avoiding use of 
external third-party mechanisms; some maritime dispute cases were brought to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The tendency of ASEAN 
members to seek international assistance is often criticized by scholars because it reflects 
ASEAN’s incapability to resolve intra-ASEAN disputes.  
If the norms mandated in the ASEAN Charter fail to prevent the members from 
seeking third-party settlement, it is worthwhile to know under what conditions Southeast 
Asian countries seek third-party mechanisms to solve their maritime disputes. To answer 
this question, this chapter will investigate a maritime dispute between Malaysia and 
Singapore over Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge in the Singapore Strait as 
a case study by analyzing two variables: economic value and island sovereignty. Other 
case studies to be analyzed in this chapter are the dispute over the Sipadan Ligitan Islands 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the dispute over the Singapore reclamation works 
involving Malaysia and Singapore. The analysis over the economic value of the disputed 
waters and the sovereignty status of the islands will show that there are no common 
patterns in Southeast Asia for this type of settlement. This is because the number of 
disputes that are concluded through this means is very limited. Nevertheless, maritime 
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disputes that involved disputes over island sovereignty in resource-poor areas seem to be 
the strongest case for the countries to move towards third-party settlement; the presence 
of disputed islands is likely to end bilateral negotiations in a stalemate, while the absence 
of natural resources discourages them from taking military action.  
A. THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD AND IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 
International arbitration is one of the available solutions, besides provisional 
arrangements for the disputing countries, to settle their unresolved maritime disputes. The 
possibility of using international arbitrations as a means for dispute settlement is set in 
the UNCLOS. According to the Article 287, UNCLOS members are free to choose one or 
more of the following to solve their disputes: 1) the ITLOS, 2) the ICJ, 3) an arbitral 
tribunal, and 4) a “special arbitral tribunal.”156 The ITLOS was established by the 
mandate of the 3rd UNCLOS as a means to settle disputes emerging from different 
understandings and applications of the UNCLOS. The ITLOS is an independent 
organization even though it has close relations with the United Nations; the Tribunal has 
observer status in the General Assembly.157 The ICJ, on the other hand, is a legal body 
under the United Nations. The ICJ’s roles are to solve any legal disputes submitted by the 
United Nations members, not only limited to the interpretation of the UNCLOS or 
maritime matters. The next form of arbitration, an arbitral tribunal, is the default means 
of disputing settlements if the disputing states do not agree on a particular form of 
arbitration. The arbitral tribunal is an internal arbitration within the UNCLOS for the 
signatories. Unlike institutional arbitration like the ICJ or the ITLOS, the arbitral tribunal 
can be categorized as ad hoc, since it does not have a permanent institution. The arbitral 
tribunal exists only when parties initiate it. It consists of five members who are 
nominated by the disputing parties as mentioned in UNCLOS Article 3 Annex VII.158 
The most recent use of the arbitral tribunal was for the disputes in the South China Sea 
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between the Philippines and China, where the Philippines were willing to bring the 
disputes to international arbitration while China rejected such an initiative. Last, the 
special arbitral tribunal is to solve disputes that require experts in “(1) fisheries, (2) 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and 
(4) navigation.”159 With such various forms of tribunals, disputing countries could 
choose any of them to solve their maritime disputes in circumstances that require 
international arbitration.     
Although it is relatively rare in Southeast Asia, dispute settlements through 
international arbitrations have been widely used worldwide. The first case brought to the 
ICJ was in 1947 when the United Kingdom sought compensation from Albania after a 
couple of incidents in the Corfu Channel.160 To date, 160 cases have been submitted to 
the ICJ for both contentious cases and advisory proceedings.161 Among them, 25 cases 
are related to the maritime disputes. The most recent ongoing maritime disputes brought 
to the ICJ are the maritime delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua (submitted in February 2014) and the disputes 
between Somalia and Kenya over maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean (submitted in 
August 2014). In the ITLOS, a total of 25 cases have been resolved, including maritime 
delimitation disputes between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal and a 
dispute over the maritime boundary between Ghana and Ivory Coast in the Atlantic 
Ocean.162 The two international tribunal bodies provide useful mechanisms to solve 
various international disputes. The various means of dispute settlement by a third-party 
organization, as stated in the UNCLOS, are intended to accommodate competing 
countries in resolving any possible disputes in flexible and peaceful ways. 
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In Southeast Asia, dispute settlements through the facilitation of international 
tribunals are uncommon; some scholars even judge that such a mechanism reflects 
ASEAN’s inability to resolve intra-ASEAN conflicts through internal mechanism.163 The 
first case brought to the international tribunal was a dispute concerning the sovereignty 
between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear Temple in 1959. That was the 
only case of international arbitration among Southeast Asian countries until 1998 when 
Indonesia and Malaysia went jointly to the ICJ to seek an answer of sovereignty of 
Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. This case was the first case in the region brought to 
international arbitration after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. Five years later, 
Malaysia and Singapore were competing in two different cases and sought solutions to 
both the ICJ and ITLOS. Both nations submitted a dispute over the sovereignty of Pedra 
Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge—small maritime features at the eastern end of 
the Singapore Strait—to the ICJ in February 2003. In September of the same year, the 
governments of both countries, initiated by Malaysia, filed another dispute to the ITLOS 
regarding Singapore’s reclamation works in the Johor Strait. Another effort to consult the 
ICJ was taken by Cambodia and Thailand in 2011 following several military clashes in a 
dispute over territorial borders in the vicinity of the Preah Vihear Temple. In 2012, 
Myanmar concluded its maritime boundaries with Bangladesh through the ITLOS. The 
last example of the involvement of the international court in Southeast Asia was when the 
Philippines brought the disputes in the South China Sea against China. Based on those 
cases, a third-party settlement method is rarely chosen by the ASEAN members as the 
dispute mechanism, considering the fact that there have been only three disputes between 
ASEAN members—not to mention the 1959 Preah Vihear case—and two cases involving 
non-ASEAN members brought to the international arbitrations since the establishment of 
ASEAN. But if we see that all five cases happened since 1998 to date, then the third-
party settlement could be considered a new trend in dispute settlement in the region.  
The experience of Southeast Asian countries in engaging international bodies to 
settle interstate conflicts also provides interesting lessons learned. Table 5 shows all 
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maritime disputes in Southeast Asia that have been brought to international arbitrations. 
There have been only three types of international arbitration involved in Southeast Asian 
conflict resolutions: the ICJ, the ITLOS, and the ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The selections 
of these arbitrations are mainly because the nature of the disputes, which can be 
categorized into three different groups. Out of six, three cases dealt exclusively with the 
issue of sovereignty in the land or islands. The disputes of Preah Vihear Temple; Sipadan 
and Ligitan; and Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge were the issues of 
sovereignty over islands disputed between competing countries. The dispute over the 
Singapore reclamation works and the Myanmar-Bangladesh dispute belong to the next 
group, namely the dispute about maritime boundaries that require UNCLOS 
interpretation. Last, China’s nine-dashed line idea that was rejected by the Philippines 
dealt with both island sovereignty and UNCLOS interpretation. Based on these 
categorizations, ASEAN members prefer for the ICJ to solve disputes over land or island 
sovereignty, while the ITLOS was selected to settle matters specifically related to the 
UNCLOS articles.  
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15 June 1962” (Hague: International Court of Justice, 1962), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
45/4873.pdf; “Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/
Malaysia): Judgment of 17 December 2002” (Hague: International Court of Justice, 2002), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf; “Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore): Summary of the Judgement of 23 
May 2008,” (Hague: International Court of Justice, 2008), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/
14506.pdf; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore  
in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore): Provisional Measures:  
Order (Hamburg:  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 2003), https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/Order.08.10.03.E.pdf; Jay Batongbacal, “Arbitration 
101: Philippines v. China,” Asia Maritime Transparency  
Initiative, January 21, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/arbitration-101-philippines-v-china/; “Dispute 
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and  
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar): Order of 19 August 2011”  
(Hamburg: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 2011), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/
itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/16_order_190811_en.pdf. 
The last category, the dispute between the Philippines and China in the South 
China Sea, could fall into the two previous categories, thus could employ either the ICJ 
or the ITLOS. The Philippines, however, could only bring the dispute to the arbitral 
tribunal (the third option under Article 287) because China, as the opposition, rejected 
internationalizing the dispute, including bringing it to the international arbitration. This 
situation made the arbitral tribunal the only feasible solution based on Article 287(5) of 
the UNCLOS which states: “if the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same 
procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in 
accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.”164 Article 9 Annex VII 
further rules that the absence of one of the parties does not cause the process arbitration 
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process to stop.165 The arbitral tribunal consists of five members, of which the 
Philippines appointed one and the President of the ITLOS appointed the remaining 
four.166 The established Tribunal held its first meeting on July 11, 2013 and conducted 
subsequent meetings that resulted in the issuance of the Rules of Procedure on August 27. 
In the Rules of Procedures, the Tribunal designated the PCA as the register institution for 
the future proceedings.167 The PCA itself is not a court as it lacks permanent judges. It is 
“a permanent framework for arbitral tribunals constituted to resolve specific disputes.”168 
PCA’s role in the case between the Philippines and China was just to facilitate the arbitral 
tribunal to proceed and to provide administrative service during the whole process. 
Despite the differences, most of the maritime cases share common patterns. The 
Sipadan Ligitan, Pedra Branca, and South China Sea disputes were about island 
sovereignties. Another prominent variable is the value of disputed areas; most instances 
of the third-party settlements took place in resource-poor areas. The next sections will 
discuss the Pedra Branca dispute as a case study and the other two cases as comparisons.  
B. CASE STUDY: PEDRA BRANCA, MIDDLE ROCKS, AND SOUTH 
LEDGE DISPUTE 
1. Conflict Overview/ Historical Background 
The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over maritime features at the 
eastern end of the Singapore Strait was one of several disagreements in the two countries’ 
history that were finally concluded by the decision of the ICJ. The concern of the two 
neighboring countries was initially about the sovereignty of Pedra Branca, or Pulau Batu 
Puteh, which later included the two other maritime features in its vicinity: Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge. Pedra Branca is a 137-meter-long and 60-meter-wide-average granite 
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island that is situated just 7.6 nautical miles north of Indonesia’s Bintan Island.169 The 
two terms, Portuguese “Pedra Branca” and Malay “Batu Puteh” refer to the same 
meaning: the white rock, referring to the rock’s white appearance, covered by groups of 
sea birds.170 Middle Rocks are two small rocks located 1,200 yards south of Pedra 
Branca that are permanently above water; South Ledge, on the other hand, is another rock 
that is only visible during low tide.171 The dispute arose when Malaysia issued the 1979 
New Map that designated Pedra Branca as Malaysia’s territory. Singapore first sent a 
diplomatic note in 1980 to protest Malaysia’s claim, which later gave rise to a series of 
diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Despite intense diplomatic negotiations 
between from the 1980s to the 1990s, both governments failed to resolve the dispute, thus 
bringing the case to the ICJ in 2003. The scope of the dispute then widened when 
Malaysia and Singapore included the sovereignty issue of Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
in their case to the ICJ. In a decision dated May 23, 2008, the court eventually awarded 
Pedra Branca to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia, and left the status of South 
Ledge unresolved until both countries delimit fixed maritime boundaries in the areas. 
It took more than twenty years from the first protest lodged by Singapore until the 
ICJ decision. During that period, both governments committed to engage in diplomatic 
negotiations up to the Prime Minister Level. At least three serious discussions between 
the leaders of the two countries had been held concerning the issue of Pedra Branca from 
1980 to 1991.172 Following the 1980 diplomatic protest, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and 
Malaysia’s Dato Hussein Onn discussed the issue, finally agreeing to solve the dispute 
peacefully. These leaders’ statements managed to keep the dispute in a relatively peaceful 
state, even though Singapore’s initiative to conduct a naval blockade around Pedra 
Branca later in 1986 heated up both states’ relations.173 The diplomatic effort progressed 
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a little bit after Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad agreed to having document 
exchanges to prove the rock’s sovereignty in the next year.174 In 1989, however, 
Singapore proposed to bring the dispute to an international arbitration, which Malaysia 
did not agree to.175 Both countries’ leaders still committed to resolve the dispute 
bilaterally, which was concluded by the submissions of each memorandum to support 
each claim in 1992. From this point onward, the negotiations were held at the ministerial 
level by conducting two rounds of bilateral talks. Singapore surprisingly brought the 
issue of Middle Rocks and South Ledge in addition to Pedra Branca to the first round of 
talks in 1993.176 Because Kuala Lumpur perceived this behavior as uncooperative, the 
progress of diplomatic talks was hampered.177 The second round, held in the following 
year, eventually failed to advance as both parties were unwilling to compromise on each 
claim. Facing such situations put the bilateral efforts in a stalemate, thus leading the 
political leaders, Goh Chok Tong and Mahathir Mohamad, to take legal action by 
bringing the dispute to the ICJ. 
The process at the ICJ took several years to complete. After agreeing to use the 
international court, both Malaysia and Singapore had to finalize and sign a Special 
Agreement required for the Statutes of the ICJ non-signatories; this was not completed 
until 2003.178 There was a necessary to pause the discussion from 1997 to 2002 to 
“enable Malaysia . . . to settle another set of disputes with Indonesia concerning 
sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan.”179 The signed Special Agreement 
mentions that “the Court is requested to determine whether sovereignty over : (a) Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh; (b) Middle Rocks; (c) South Ledge, belongs to Malaysia or the 
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Republic of Singapore.”180 The process at the Court itself consisted of three phases: the 
written proceedings, the oral proceedings, and the judgment. Both parties developed their 
arguments in written and hearing phases before the sixteen judges made the final 
decision. After reviewing each party’s pleadings and arguments, the Court issued the 
final judgment in May 23, 2008 in a 185-page report, which awarded Pedra Branca to 
Singapore, Middle Rocks as Malaysia’s, and put off the legal status of South Ledge until 
Malaysia and Singapore finalize their maritime boundaries in the surrounding waters. The 
Court perceived that sovereignty of Pedra Branca had been passed to Singapore in 1980 
based on the principle of effective occupation showed by the two parties, in which 
Singapore demonstrated more convincing acts in exercising sovereignty than 
Malaysia.181 For Middle Rocks, the Court did not see any significant conduct performed 
by both parties to demonstrate sovereignty. In consequence, the judges decided that the 
ownership of Middle Rocks remained with Malaysia as the successor of the Johor 
sultanate.182 South Ledge, on the other hand, was treated as a unique feature due to its 
physical condition, which appears only during low tide so that it could not generate 
maritime zones. This condition made the ICJ decided that “the ownership of South Ledge 
. . . belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located.”183 This decision 
ended the long-standing dispute between Malaysia and Singapore. Both countries showed 
their respect for international law and commitment to solve the dispute peacefully in the 
spirit of the TAC. 
2. Economic Values 
Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge are located in areas that do not 
yield significant natural resources. The Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas 
contains maps showing the absence of oil and gas deposits as well as undiscovered oil 
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and gas potential in the Strait of Singapore.184 In its memorial, Malaysia mentioned the 
issue of natural resources in the disputed areas. Two agreements were concluded between 
the Malaysian government and two petroleum companies, Continental Oil Company of 
Malaysia and Esso Exploration Malaysia Inc., regarding rights of explorations in the 
whole Western Malaysia continental shelf.185 The attached map of the concession area 
clearly shows the location of Pedra Branca was included within the concession area.186 
This evidence, however, cannot conclude that the areas have potential natural resource 
reserves. There has been no single exploitation conducted by any coastal state in the areas 
since 1968.   
Another economic value that might be taken into consideration was the fishing 
activities. Historically, the waters surrounding Pedra Branca was a place for indigenous 
people living along the coasts called orang laut (men of the sea) to fish. Around a 
thousand Johor fishermen still currently operate in the areas as their livelihood; the areas 
are famous sources to catch the galama kuning, an expensive, rare fish.187 The fisheries 
had been one of the sources of conflict when the Singapore Navy imposed a blockade 
around Pedra Branca, preventing any unauthorized parties, including the fishermen, from 
approaching the island.188 This dispute was then resolved by the two governments 
following the ICJ decision with Singapore opening the waters around Pedra Branca for 
traditional fishing activities.189 Even though there are still active fisheries in the areas, the 
significance of this sector to both countries economy is minimal. The economic factor 
was not the motive for Malaysia and Singapore to claim Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, 
                                                 
184 Morgan and Valencia, Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas, 101–3. 
185 “Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South 
Ledge: Malaysia/Singapore: Memorial of Malaysia,” March 25, 2004, 119, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/130/14139.pdf. 
186 Ibid., 120. 
187 “Republic’s Claim a Sore Point with 1,000 Coastal Fishermen,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), 
July 24, 2008, 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1492633/republics_claim_a_sore_point_with_1000_coastal_fisher
men/. 
188 Kadir Mohamad, Malaysia Singapore, 111. 
189 “Pedra Branca `open’ to Fishermen,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), June 7, 2008. 
 68
and South Ledge. The areas are valuable for their strategic location, as a hub between the 
South China Sea and the Singapore Strait, rather than for their economic value. 
3. Island Status/ Sovereignty 
The case of Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge was a dispute over 
island or maritime feature sovereignty. The bottom line of this case was a debate about 
whether those features were categorized as terra nullius or uti possidetis juris. Both 
parties used historical narratives backed by relevant documents to strengthen their 
arguments. The ICJ then examined each party’s arguments and proofs to yield objective 
and fair decisions. The ICJ also considered the principle of modern territorial acquisition 
based on international law when it judged Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge 
as terra nullius. According to Peter Malanczuk, the transfer of sovereignty over a 
territory with uncertain title can be classified as one of the following: cession, 
occupation, prescription, operations of nature, creation, adjudication, and conquest.190 In 
Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks cases, the final judgment was based on the effective 
occupation principle performed by both Malaysia and Singapore.  
Malaysia’s claim regarding Pedra Branca was based on an argument that Pedra 
Branca lies in the areas that were previously known within the Johor Sultanate territory, 
and that Malaysia is the only legitimate successor of the sultanate. Malaysia rejected the 
terra nullius claim by saying in the written memorial that it “has an original title to Pulau 
Batu Puteh of long standing.”191 The most obvious argument according to Kuala Lumpur 
was that the rock is situated closer to Malaysia than Singapore (6.6 compared to 25.5 
nautical miles) and within Malaysian territorial waters (Figure 6). The continuous 
presence of orang laut in Pedra Branca, inhabitants living along the islands along the 
coast of Malay Peninsula that were subjects of the Sultanate, affirmed the sovereignty of 
Johor.192 A major political change in the region in 1824, when the British and the Dutch 
defined their sphere of influence, kept Pedra Branca under the sovereignty of the Johor 
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Sultanate. The next important event happened soon after the Anglo-Dutch treaty, when 
the British and Johor ruler signed the 1824 Crawfurd Treaty, which also did not change 
the Pedra Branca status. In this treaty, Temanggong of Johor ceded Singapore and 
surrounding islets within a 10 nautical mile radius to the English East India Company in 
exchange for British security assurances. Malaysia argued that this secession did not 
include Pedra Branca which lay beyond 10 nautical miles from the island. Another 
supporting argument of Malaysia was the construction of Horsburgh lighthouse by 
British authorities in 1836. Malaysia contended that the British did ask permission to 
Johor authority prior conducting the work; this implied the sovereignty of Johor over 
Pedra Branca.193 All the claims made by Malaysia relied on its history as Johor’s 
successor, which inherited Johor’s territory post-1824. The arguments barely discussed 
the positive conduct of Malaysia as a sovereign nation over Pedra Branca, which was 
very important to prove the sovereignty based on international law. 
Figure 6.  Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge Locations 
 
Source: Kadir Muhammad, Malaysia Singapore: Fifty Years of Contentions 1965–2015 
(Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2015). 
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Singapore, in contrast, argued that Pedra Branca was considered terra nullius. 
Singapore did not question the Crawfurd Treaty. Instead, it insisted that Pedra Branca 
belonged to no one prior to 1847. Subsequently, the British government owned Pedra 
Branca, marked by the construction of the Horsburgh Lighthouse from 1847 to 1851.194 
Since then the East India Company, as the representative of British authority, later 
continued by Singapore, showed continuous conduct exercising sovereignty in Pedra 
Branca. Singapore also pointed to the conduct of Malaysia related to Pedra Branca to 
support Singapore’s claim. According to Singapore, Malaysia recognized the sovereignty 
of Singapore over Pedra Branca, which was shown in a letter dated September 21, 1953 
from the Johor State Secretary, who wrote: “the Johore Government does not claim 
ownership of Pedra Branca.”195 In addition, Malaysian officials continuously asked 
permission from the Singapore authority to get access to visit Pedra Branca on several 
occasions.196 Malaysia even depicted Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore on a 
number of Malaysian maps prior to 1979.197 Malaysia later claimed that the depictions 
were merely technical errors, and thus could not be interpreted as an acknowledgement of 
sovereignty.198 These arguments were to support the principle of effective occupation 
conducted by Singapore to the “no man’s land” to be recognized as the sovereign nation.  
The ICJ’s final judgment accommodated both countries’ claims, which confirmed 
that Pedra Branca was not terra nullius and that the conduct of Singapore towards the 
island demonstrated the act of sovereignty. The Court noted that the Johor Sultanate’s 
territory included all islands and maritime features in the Singapore Strait, including 
Pedra Branca, thus the island was not terra nullius. The Court also agreed that the 
relations between Johon and the orang laut affirmed the sovereignty of the sultanate over 
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Pedra Branca. The Court, however, did not reject the originality of the 1953 official letter 
that explained the position of the sultanate with regard to Pedra Branca at that time, 
which Johor did not claim to have sovereignty over the island.199 The appearance of the 
word “Singapore” on Pedra Branca on the maps published by the Malaysian was 
perceived as Malaysia’s confirmation to Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca.200 
The Court eventually concluded that “by 1980 sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh had passed to Singapore.”201 This decision itself relied on international law, which 
states that “[s]overeignty over territory might under certain circumstances pass as a result 
of the failure of the State which has sovereignty to respond to conduct à titre de 
souverain of the other State or to concrete manifestations of the display of territorial 
sovereignty by other State.”202 It was not clear that the ICJ marked 1980 as the year when 
the sovereignty over the island was passed from Malaysia to Singapore because no major 
event happened in that year except the protest of Singapore against Malaysia’s 1979 map. 
The disputing parties failed to provide evidence, making it difficult for the court to track 
the exact date of the passing of sovereignty.  
C. OTHER CASES: SIPADAN-LIGITAN AND SINGAPORE 
RECLAMATION 
This section will discuss other maritime disputes in Southeast Asia that were 
concluded by the international arbitrations, which were featured by different 
characteristics of the variables than in the Pedra Branca dispute. The two cases are the 
Sipgadan-Ligitan disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and the Singapore 
reclamation works between Malaysia and Singapore. In the conflict over Sipadan and 
Ligitan, Malaysia and Indonesia disputed the sovereignty of the islands that lie in 
resource-abundant seas; whereas, the Singapore reclamation case gives an example that 
the dispute in resource-rich areas with no sovereignty issue could also be brought to the 
ICJ. 
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1. Sipadan-Ligitan Case 
The dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands 
was longstanding. It emerged in 1969 and concluded in 2003 by the ICJ. Sipadan and 
Ligitan are only two tiny islets situated east of Sebatik Island, an island which is shared 
by Indonesia and Malaysia by the 4°10’ latitude as per agreement between the Dutch and 
the British in the 1891 Treaty. The two islands sit on areas that are believed to have 
abundant gas and oil reserves of at least approximately “764 million barrels of oil and 1.4 
trillion cubic feet of gas.”203 In the middle of the talks, the two parties were aware of the 
presence of potential sovereignty issues over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, which led them 
to halt the discussion over the maritime boundaries until the dispute had been settled.204 
Ten years later, the publication of the New Malaysian Map attracted international 
attention, as it depicted the two islands as falling within Malaysian sovereignty. Indonesia 
claimed that the two islands belonged to it since they were situated south of the 4°10’ 
parallel per the 1891 Treaty. The Indonesian government reacted by protesting the map 
publication and initiated high-level discussion with Malaysian officials, including the 
Prime Minister. The meeting between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Hussein 
Onn in 1980 as well as with the Malaysian foreign minister in 1982 did not achieve 
concrete resolution, but instead a commitment to solve the dispute peacefully.205 The 
Malaysia-Indonesia relations heated up in the subsequent years following unconducive 
actions conducted by each party. To calm the situation, Soeharto and Mahathir met in the 
“four-eyes” discussion to agree upon the attitude of keeping the dispute bilateral rather 
than involving any international organization.206 Up to this point, Indonesia and Malaysia 
committed to use the ASEAN way approach by promoting quiet diplomacy.  
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 The course of the dispute changed in 1994 when Malaysian officials first 
introduced the possibility of bringing the dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan to 
international arbitration. Kuala Lumpur believed this method would bring the best 
outcome in its favor. Mahathir Muhammad, who previously opposed dispute 
internationalization, eventually shared the same view that “the ICJ offered the best 
solution.”207 This idea was initially rejected by Jakarta, which maintained the stance to 
settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations. Even if the negotiations failed to reach 
such agreement, the Soeharto administration would choose a third-party mechanism 
through the ASEAN High Council rather than the ICJ.208 The ASEAN High Council is a 
body mandated by the TAC to settle unresolved disputes between the TAC signatories; 
its members include a minister from each ASEAN country, including those in dispute.209 
The High Council could “recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of 
settlement . . . [and] appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the 
dispute.”210 On the other hand, it lacked a binding power to force the disputing parties to 
obey its decisions. Malaysia refused this idea because it realized that the High Council, 
which was represented by ministers from every ASEAN member, would support 
Indonesia, since most of them also disputed Malaysia’s unilateral claim following the 
1979 New Map publication.211 Having the different dispute resolution preference, both 
countries continued their negotiations intensely until a serious meeting in mid-1996 
produced joint-recommendation for both governments.212 The recommendation was to 
bring the dispute to the ICJ. Both countries’ leaders finally agreed upon bringing the 
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dispute to the ICJ as recommended. The Court itself awarded the islands to Malaysia 
based on the principle of effectivités.  
Unlike the Pedra Branca dispute, the contention between Indonesia and Malaysia 
was over island sovereignty situated in resource-rich areas, which is usually difficult to 
resolve peacefully. The fact that both countries managed to solve the conflict peacefully, 
although through the international arbitration, left an interesting discussion. The reasons 
behind the decision to bring this dispute to the ICJ were not clear, especially for 
Indonesia’s side that always rejected internationalization of the dispute since the 
beginning. One possible reason that drove President Soeharto to accept Malaysia’s 
proposal was the urgency in promoting regional stability in order to maintain Indonesia’s 
economic development.213 The period when the dispute arose was a difficult period for 
the Southeast Asian economy, including Indonesia. Facing economic recession, Soeharto 
needed to have good relations with every country, including Malaysia, to boost the 
Indonesian economy. The conflict between the two countries over sovereignty evidently 
did not end smoothly post-ICJ decision. Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in several 
naval clashes years later which, despite their small scale, degraded the two countries’ 
relations once again. It was a dispute over the Ambalat blocks, waters around the Sipadan 
Ligitan Islands, believed to contain a huge amount of oil and gas deposits. This dispute 
happened because the ICJ did not conclude the maritime borders right after the decision 
of Sipadan and Ligitan.214 This case shows that the presence of disputed islands in 
resource-rich areas has the potential to cause contention, although it had been solved in 
relatively peaceful ways.    
2. Dispute over Singapore Reclamation Works 
The dispute emerged in 2002, when Malaysia protested Singapore reclamation 
projects. In that period, Singapore was currently developing Tuas View Extension, an 
area planned to be Singapore’s future major port. The Malaysian government accused the 
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Singapore reclamation in Tuas of encroaching into Malaysian territorial waters. Malaysia 
claimed that the reclamation works infringed with Malaysia’s “Point 20.” Point 20 is one 
of the points off the coast of Tuas that was claimed by Malaysia to be its own. Malaysia 
asserted a portion of waters enclosed by points 19, 20, and 21 as its territorial waters (see 
Figure 7). This claim was, again, based on the Malaysia’s controversial 1979 map 
published by the Malaysian government showing Malaysia’s maritime boundaries. 
Malaysia’s protest on Point 20 was only the beginning of the story. 
The scope of the dispute widened when Malaysia protested the reclamation work 
in Tekong Island and Ubin Island as an environmental issue. Malaysia alleged that the 
reclamation works in the areas caused environmental degradation that could negatively 
impact marine ecosystem and affect the livelihood of Malaysian fishermen.215 The Johor 
people also worried that the reclamation would shallow the Johor River so that the river 
“could not sustain enough marine life.”216 A Johor official further said that the extension 
of Tekong Island would narrow the shipping channel towards Malaysia’s Pasir Gudang 
Port, thus would dissuade ships from visiting the port.217 These protests heated the 
relations of both countries, which eventually brought the issue up to third-party 
settlement. In this case, Kuala Lumpur was the initiator that brought the dispute to the 
ITLOS.  
Malaysia brought the dispute to the ITLOS by filing the provisional measures on 
September 5, 2003. The involvement of the ITLOS marked a new episode of the land 
reclamation dispute. The arbitration process consisted of three phases: the written 
pleadings, the oral proceedings, and the judgment. In the written pleading, Malaysia 
based its legal claim on territorial and environmental problems. In the written response, 
Singapore argued that Malaysia failed to prove the negative impact of the reclamation to 
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the marine environment or the violation to Malaysian sovereignty.218 On October 8, 
2003, the ITLOS issued an order considering the preceding written pleads and oral 
hearings. The tribunal did not order Singapore to stop its reclamation, instead ordering 
both countries to cooperate in resolving the problem. The tribunal also mandated 
“Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might cause irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the marine environment.”219 This 
decision concluded the 20-month dispute.  
This dispute had different characteristics than Pedra Branca case. Malaysia and 
Singapore did not dispute island sovereignty, instead they established maritime 
boundaries. On the other hand, the area disputed contained major economic values. The 
two countries disputed sea access to the future major ports, which is very important for 
the Malaysian and Singaporean economies. The location of Singapore’s future container 
ports was just off the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP), Malaysia’s largest container port, 
which was launched on March 2000, a year prior to Singapore’s building on Tuas. The 
Malaysian Government had designed the PTP to be a serious rival to Singapore’s ports, 
with a capacity of 2 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) a year. The Singapore 
ports have currently dominated the port business in the region with a capacity of 17 
million TEU a year in 2000.220 Meanwhile, the Singapore government plans Tuas to be, 
in the future, Singapore’s largest container port with a capacity of 65 million TEU in 
2025.221 Malaysia worried its container port would be challenged by Singapore’s new 
port, and that the reclamation works would shallow the deep-water access to the PTP. 
The fact that they sought the ITLOS to resolve the dispute is interesting to analyze. 
Malaysia was probably motivated by winning in Sipadan Ligatan case against Indonesia 
in 2002; this option was proposed to a country that always prefers international legal 
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judgment like Singapore. Like other cases, the two countries had discussed the dispute 
bilaterally before submitting to the ITLOS. The fact that arbitration through the ITLOS 
was chosen rather than military force, when negotiations stalemated, shows that both 
countries committed to a peaceful dispute resolution between Singapore and Malaysia. 
Figure 7.  Point 20 in Tuas Reclamation Area 
 
Source: Cheong Koon Hean, Malaysia and Singapore: The Reclamation Case: From 
Dispute to Settlement (Singapore: Straits Times Press Pte Ltd, 2013). 
D. SUMMARY 
Some countries brought their unresolved disputes to third-party settlements as an 
alternative for peaceful dispute resolutions because they perceive international 
arbitrations as fair mechanisms to solve the disputes and have legal power to force the 
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parties to obey whatever decisions had been made by the arbitrations. In Southeast Asia, 
there had been a tendency to use such mechanisms to solve maritime disputes. This can 
be seen in five cases related to maritime disputes submitted to various types of 
international arbitrations by ASEAN members since the 1990s. Indonesia and Malaysia 
were the first to bring a dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to the ICJ in 1998 
followed by Pedra Branca and reclamation work disputes of Singapore and Malaysia to 
the ICJ and the ITLOS in 2003. Myanmar concluded its maritime borders with 
Bangladesh through the ITLOS in 2012, marked as the first maritime delimitation in 
Southeast Asia made through the third-party mechanism. The last case was the 
Philippines, which submitted its dispute against China over sovereignty in the South 
China Sea. This trend shows that third-party settlement through international arbitrations 
could be a useful means for peaceful dispute resolutions; at the same time, embracing 
external bodies is an indicator that ASEAN lacks an internal settlement mechanism.  
Unlike maritime delimitation and joint-development resolutions, analysis over 
Pedra Branca, Sipadan-Ligitan, and Singapore reclamation disputes show no common 
patterns underlying ASEAN countries to seek external third-party mechanisms to resolve 
their maritime disputes. In the Pedra Branca case, the absence of significant economic 
values in the disputed areas and the presence of disputed island sovereignty led Singapore 
and Malaysia to bring the dispute to the ICJ. This seems to be the strongest case for 
countries to seek international arbitrations. The disputed island sovereignty causes the 
bilateral negotiations to fail, while the absence of natural resources reduces the 
importance of the dispute compared to the other factors. The Sipadan Ligitan Islands 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia was over island sovereignty in resource-rich 
areas. Both countries agreed to bring the dispute to the ICJ mainly for political 
considerations, especially for Indonesia. Indonesia’s leader focused more on economic 
recovery following the financial crisis in 1998, believing that the prolonged dispute with 
Malaysia would not benefit Indonesian economy. The tensions remained high in the 
following years as a consequence of undelimited maritime boundaries. The dispute over 
Singapore reclamation works between Malaysia and Singapore had strong economic 
motives rather than sovereignty issues. This case shows that Malaysia and Singapore 
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favor international arbitrations to solve their disputes when bilateral efforts fail to 
conclude agreements. The three case studies show that various conditions could motivate 
ASEAN countries to bring disputes to third-party settlement if the bilateral negotiations 
ended in deadlocks. In a case where diplomatic negotiations were unsuccessful, 
international arbitrations could become one of the options available to resolve the 
conflicts. This mechanism is more preferable by Southeast Asian countries than the 
internal third-party mechanism like the High Council because international arbitrations 
offer legal certainty that obliged the parties to accept the decision. 
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V. MILITARIZED DISPUTES 
Despite its broad recognition as a relatively peaceful region, some serious 
disputes that escalated into military skirmishes sometimes involved Southeast Asian 
countries. Most of those disputes were about sovereignty. The adoption of the uti 
possidetis juris principle as former Western colonies did not automatically free Southeast 
Asian countries from sovereignty disputes among them, in land and even at sea. Most of 
the disputes, including border disputes, were fortunately resolved peacefully, such as 
bilateral agreements, third-party settlement, and provisional arrangements. These three 
dispute settlements are peaceful approaches adopted by Southeast Asian countries, 
particularly ASEAN members, as mandated by the ASEAN Charter and the TAC. 
However, some instances of small-scale military frictions could not be avoided even 
though all members of ASEAN are bound by the commitment to settle the disputes 
peacefully.222 The 2008 clash between the Cambodian and Thai armies over disputed 
borders around the Preah Vihear Temple, that resulted in victims on both sides, was the 
most recent example to illustrate that such incidents in Southeast Asia are sometimes 
unavoidable. At sea, the occurrence of violent maritime disputes is more prevalent since 
the tension in the South China Sea remains high. 
The experience of having such militarized disputes should be taken into account 
in anticipating Southeast Asia’s current and future disputes. It is important then to know 
what factors led Southeast Asian countries to abandon their pledges to avoid a military 
approach in every conflict, especially in the maritime realm. To answer, this chapter will 
discuss the militarized maritime disputes in the region and analyze the South China Sea 
conflicts as a case study. The analysis concludes that maritime disputes that led into 
military tensions were likely in resource-rich areas with sovereignty disputes over islands 
or maritime features. This is because the issue of sovereignty is always sensitive for 
sovereign nations, including Southeast Asian states; in addition, the prospect of gaining 
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economic value from potential hydrocarbon reserves in the disputed areas increased the 
sensitivity of the disputes that prevented them from compromise.  
A. MILITARIZED MARITIME DISPUTES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Several maritime disputes that involved military forces have occurred in 
Southeast Asian waters since the 1960s. Longstanding border conflicts between 
Cambodia and Thailand impacted their relations in the maritime areas. Not long after the 
ICJ decision to award Preah Vihear to Cambodia in 1962, both countries claimed the 
sovereignty of Koh Kut Island. In 1965, at the height of the dispute, Thailand’s warning 
to Cambodia not to approach Koh Kut resulted in a small-scale naval clash.223 No further 
engagement had been reported even though the sovereignty of Koh Kut remained with 
Thailand. Another militarized dispute involving Southeast Asian countries happened in 
1986, when Singapore enforced a naval blockade in the disputed Pedra Branca to prevent 
any approach by Malaysia to the island, including the fishermen.224 Another standoff 
between the two navies took place in April 1992 when two patrol boats from each 
country engaged each other near Pedra Branca.225. Both governments finally agreed to 
bring the dispute to the ICJ instead of defending each claim to the islands through 
military confrontation.  
Ambalat is another flashpoint in Southeast Asia. Ambalat, a portion of waters in 
the Sulawesi Sea that is believed to be rich in natural resources, is disputed by Indonesia 
and Malaysia. This was the continuation of the dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands 
that was resolved through the ICJ due to undelimited maritime boundaries following the 
ICJ decision. In 2005, both navies’ patrol boats bumped each other while patrolling in the 
disputed area. That incident left no serious casualties but heated up the relations between 
the two neighbors. The conflict emerged following concessions granted by Malaysia to 
Royal Dutch Shell and Petronas to explore the area, the same zone in which the 
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Indonesian government gave similar rights to UNOCAL.226 The issues reemerged in 
2008-09 as Indonesia blamed Malaysia for continuous territorial violations even though it 
did not result in open confrontation as before. However, the issue sparked a broader 
national sentiment on Indonesia’s side as the public preferred the use of military force 
and called for the spirit of Ganyang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) against Malaysia as in 
the 1960s. The Ambalat issue worsened the relations of both neighbors which were 
already degraded due to the issues of “the treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia 
and the alleged ‘theft’ by Malaysians of Indonesia’s cultural heritage.”227 The conflicts 
only abated after both governments decided to handle them through bilateral discussions.  
The South China Sea is probably the most troubled waters in Southeast Asia and 
has been in the headlines since the 1990s. Six countries claim maritime zones in the sea, 
which is believed to contain a significant number of hydrocarbon deposits. The disputes 
have been militarized by each of the claimants, except for Brunei. The presence of China 
poses the greatest challenge for the disputes to be resolved. Nevertheless, militarized 
disputes between ASEAN members were also common in the South China Sea dispute. 
The next section will discuss all military confrontations in the South China Sea in detail.  
Table 6 lists all militarized maritime disputes in Southeast Asia since the 1960s. 
The events included in the table are only the incidents that were related to maritime 
disputes, such as disputes over maritime boundaries, island sovereignty, and other 
disputes that occurred at sea. It excludes the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia 
during the Konfrontasi period in 1965 and the dispute between Malaysia and the 
Philippines in the 1968 Corregidor Affair.  Despite large-scale naval mobilizations, both 
conflicts were broader than just maritime conflicts. In addition, the table includes 
militarized disputes between military, law enforcement agency, and civilians, like 
fishermen.  
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Table 6.   Summary of Militarized Disputes in Southeast Asian Waters 
No Disputing 
Countries 
Date Incident Location 
1.  Thailand, 
Cambodia 




2.  China, Vietnam January 19, 
1974 
The Battle of Paracel. 
China took over the 
Crescent Group of the 
Paracel Islands from 
Vietnam. Open fires 
between the two navies. 
South China 
Sea 




Malaysian naval task 




4.  Malaysia, 
Philippines 
June 1980 A Philippine navy ship 
shot at a Malaysian 
fishing boat from Sabah. 
South China 
Sea 
5.  Malaysia, 
Singapore 
1986 Singapore navy ships 
blockade access to 
disputed Pedra Branca. 
Singapore Strait 
6.  China, Vietnam 1988 The Johnson Reef 
incident. Chinese navy 












Malaysian force seized 
49 Filipino fishermen in 
the near Commodore 
Reef. Both sides 
increased military 
presence in the area. 
South China 
Sea 
8.  China, Vietnam March 19, 
1992 
Small engagement 
between both troops after 




9.  Malaysia, 
Singapore 
April 1992 A Singaporean patrol 
boat engaged a Malaysian 




10.  China, Vietnam July –
August 
1992 
China official detained 
several Vietnamese cargo 






Date Incident Location 
smuggling activities. 
Warning shot had fired. 
11.  China, Vietnam July 1994 Two Chinese warships 
were deployed to 




12.  Thailand, Vietnam May 30, 
1995 




13.  Malaysia, China March 16, 
1995 
Malaysia patrol boats 
shot at a Chinese trawler 




14.  Philippines, China March 25, 
1995 
Philippine military 
destroyed structures built 
by China in disputed 
areas off Palawan. 
South China 
Sea 
15.  Vietnam, Taiwan March 25, 
1995 
Taiwanese Navy fired at 
a Vietnamese freighter 
that approached a 




16.  Philippines, China January 26, 
1996 
Philippine Navy 
exchanged fires with 









18.  Philippines, China January 
1998 
22 Chinese fishermen 
were arrested by the 
Philippine Navy accused 








Vietnam soldiers fired at 
a Philippine fishing boat, 
injured one fisherman. 
South China 
Sea 




A Burmese vessel 
attacked a Thai naval 
ship killing two Thai 
soldiers. 
Andaman Sea 




Exchange of fires 





Date Incident Location 
Three Burmese sailors 
dead. 
22.  Philippines, China May 1, 
1999 
Chinese naval ships 
intimidated a grounded 
Philippine navy ship. 
South China 
Sea 
23.  Philippines, China May 23, 
1999 
A Philippine navy ship 
collided with a Chinese 




24.  Philippines, China June 19, 
1999 
Another collision 
between a Philippine 
navy ship and a Chinese 
fishing boat, which sank 
the fishing boat. 
South China 
Sea 




Vietnamese troops shot at 
Philippine air force plane 
in the Spratly Islands 
South China 
Sea 




Malaysian jet fighters and 
Philippine surveillance 
planes nearly engaged 
over Malaysian-occupied 
reef in the Spratly. 
South China 
Sea 
27.  Philippines, China May 26, 
2000 
Philippine officials fired 
at Chinese fishermen 
resulting in 1 dead. 




28.  Philippines, China January –
March 
2001 
Philippine navy officers 
boarded 14 Chinese 
fishing vessels, 
confiscated their catches, 








Vietnamese soldiers fired 




30.  Brunei, Malaysia March 
2003 
Brunei sent a navy 
gunboat to prevent 
Malaysia’s drilling ship 
from approaching the oil 
field location. Malaysia 
retaliated by sending 






Date Incident Location 
Brunei’s company in the 
same area. 
31.  Indonesia, 
Malaysia 
April 2005 Two patrol boats bumped 
each other in Ambalat 
Ambalat 




Naval standoff in 
Ambalat 
Ambalat 
33.  Indonesia, China May – July 
2010 
Indonesian naval ships 




34.  Indonesia, China June 23, 
2010 
Indonesian patrol boats 
confronted a group of 
Chinese fishing vessels 
that were escorted by 




35.  Philippines, China February 
25, 2011 
A Chinese frigate shot a 
warning at Filipino 




36.  Vietnam, China May – 
June, 2011 
China cut Vietnamese 




37.  Philippines, China March 
2011 




38.  Vietnam, China July 5, 
2011 
Chinese soldiers ousted 
Vietnamese fishermen 
near the Paracel Islands. 
South China 
Sea 
39.  Philippines, China  October 18, 
2011 
Philippine navy rammed 




40.  Vietnam, China March 23, 
2012 
China detained 21 
Vietnamese fishermen 
near the Paracel Islands. 
South China 
Sea 
41.  Philippines, China April 10, 
2012 
Both countries engaged 





Adapted from: Yoram Z. Haftel, Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation: Design, 
Implementation, and the Promise of Peace, Michigan Studies in International Political Economy 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 159 and “Timeline: 1955-Present,” Center for 
New American Security, accessed February 7, 2016, http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline. 
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B. WHAT LED TO SO MANY MILITARIZED INCIDENTS IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN WATERS? 
The presence of hydrocarbon resources and the disputed island sovereignty seem 
to be the strongest reasons for Southeast Asian countries to take military actions. Table 6 
identifies at least five hotspots in Southeast Asian waters, namely the Andaman Sea, the 
Singapore Strait, the Gulf of Thailand, the Sulawesi Sea (Ambalat), and the South China 
Sea. Among them, the South China Sea is the area with the most frequent conflicts, with 
at least 34 incidents at various levels, from mere provocation to open fire. The South 
China Sea is well known for its abundant oil and natural gas resources, as well as 
fisheries. A report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts the area 
“holds approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas.”228 Those numbers were only rough estimations since the disputes in the area 
prevented optimal explorations. In number of fisheries, the South China Sea is the third 
world’s largest marine producer among 19 fishing zones.229 Another attribute 
contributing to the South China Sea’s status as one of the world’s most contentious seas 
is the contested maritime features. Hundreds of islets, reefs, and corals in the Paracel and 
the Spratly are subject to overlapping claims. None of them has clear sovereignty status.  
The other area similar to the South China Sea is Ambalat and the Gulf of 
Thailand. Located in the Sulawesi Sea off Borneo, Ambalat is also known for its potential 
natural resource deposits. A study estimates that Ambalat contains potential oil reserves 
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source of contention between Malaysia and Indonesia in the past, especially after the 
ICJ’s decision to award Sipadan and Ligitan, islands located in the area, to Malaysia. The 
settlement of the disputed islands shifted the conflict from the islands to the sea as the 
court left the maritime boundaries unresolved. The same situation applied to the conflict 
between Thailand and Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand, where military skirmishes 
between them occurred around a hydrocarbon reserves area with a sovereignty dispute 
over Koh Kut Islands. At the height of the dispute, Cambodia challenged the legality of 
Koh Kut Island being used as a basepoint by Thailand to generate maritime zones. Koh 
Kut lays in the vicinity of the Thai Basin, an area that was believed abundant in oil and 
natural gas.231 
Other contentious seas, the Singapore Strait and the Andaman Sea, have slightly 
different characteristics than the previous ones. Malaysia and Singapore disputed 
sovereignty of small islands in the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait, Pedra Branca, 
Middle Rocks, and South Ledge.232 Despite its lack of resources, the Singapore Strait is 
one the most strategic choke points in the world. The ownership of Pedra Branca and the 
islands surrounding it would add strategic and economic value to a country, since it 
would control the busiest strait in the world that connects directly to the South China Sea. 
The conflict between Myanmar and Thailand in the Andaman Sea took place in a 
resource-rich area without sovereignty disputes. This case may be the only exception to 
the generalization that militarized conflicts most commonly arose in areas that have 
abundant resources and complex sovereignty disputes. In fact, the incidents in the 
Singapore Strait and the Andaman Sea did not occur as often as in the South China Sea, 
as countries are likely to accept consensus in areas that do not meet the two criteria: 
abundant natural resources and disputed islands sovereignty. 
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C. CASE STUDY: SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 
1. The Big Picture of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea is a continuation of the Pacific Ocean that is located in the 
east of the Asian mainland. It encompasses the sea from the Strait of Malacca on the 
south to the Strait of Taiwan on the north with an estimated area of 1,423,000 square 
miles.233 Seven Asian countries have borders on the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. The South China Sea hosts 
numerous maritime features that are grouped into seven separated locations: the Pratas 
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly 
Islands, the Natuna Islands, and the Anambas Islands. All South China Sea coastal states 
have overlapping claims over maritime zones, with six of them, except Indonesia, also 
claiming sovereignty over maritime features in the areas. The overlapping claims attract 
the world’s concern, especially with the engagement of China in the conflicts. 
The Paracel and Spratly Islands are the most contentious areas due to overlapping 
claims made by six countries. The Paracel Islands is located on the north part of the 
South China Sea. An estimate of 130 small coral islands and reefs spread to two smaller 
groups: the Amphitrite Group on the northeast and the Crescent Group on the 
southwest.234 The whole features in Paracel are now under China’s control. Initially, 
China only occupied the Amphitrite Group since 1946 when it sent two ships to land on 
Woody Island.235 The other group, the Crescent, was controlled by the French and passed 
down to South Vietnam following its independence.236 China took over the Crescent 
Group after defeating the Vietnamese in the bloody incident known as the Battle of the 
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Paracel Islands in 1974.237 The islands are still contested by Vietnam and Taiwan albeit 
they are de facto under China’s control.  
The Spratly Islands lie in the southern part of the South China Sea. Prescott and 
Schofield suggest that the islands contain twenty-six islands or atolls and seven groups of 
rocks that are visible during high tide.238 Other scholars state that more than 140 features 
spread in the Spratly Islands occupied areas of more than 140,000 square kilometers.239 
All of them are small. The largest is the Itu Aba Island, which is currently occupied by 
Vietnam, with a dimension of 1.4 kilometers long and 400 meters wide.240 Among the 
140 features, 44 of them are controlled by several states, with Vietnam controlling 25, the 
Philippines controlling eight, seven by China, three by Malaysia, and Taiwan occupies 
one.241 Brunei implicitly claims the ownership of Louisa Reef that lies within Brunei’s 
claimed EEZ even though it does not control it. These countries also claim that the 
continental shelf and EEZ overlap, which complicates the dispute. 
2. Sovereignty Claims  
The basis of the claim differs for each state. Some base their claim from a 
historical perspective; others use international law. These unilateral claims resulted in the 
overlapping claims over continental shelf and EEZ as well as sovereignty over maritime 
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claims, namely the notion of terra nullius and the Law of the Sea resulting from a series 
of conventions from 1958 to 1982. This section discusses Southeast Asian countries’ 
claims to the South China Sea in alphabetical order: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam. The review also includes some incidents related to the overlapping claims 
to show the connection over these claims and dispute militarization. Figure 8 depicts the 
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. 
Brunei’s claim of maritime zones appeared in three maps it published in 1987-88. 
The first map was published in 1987 showing its territorial waters. Brunei published the 
other two in 1988 showing the continental shelf and fishery limits. The continental shelf 
map presented a rectangular-shaped area drawn from Brunei’s coastline northward. This 
claim was based on an extended 350 nautical miles continental shelf.242 The area 
included a submerged rock Louisa Reef that was also claimed by Malaysia. Brunei had 
never openly claimed sovereignty of Louisa Reef, but merely the surrounding entitled 
maritime zones.  
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Figure 8.  Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea 
 
Source: Gus Lubin, “Claims on the South China Sea,” Business Insider, February 17, 
2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/south-china-sea-territory-claims-map-2014-2. 
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Malaysia based its claim to the continental shelf extension and occupation 
principles. As a party to the 1958 continental shelf convention, Malaysia issued its own 
Continental Shelf Act number 83 in 1966 that defined the continental shelf up to “two 
hundred metres below the surface of the sea.”243 The clear depiction of the continental 
shelf claim appeared in the 1979 New Map, in which Malaysia claimed that every feature 
lay within the continental shelf claim. This map provided a legal basis for Malaysia to 
occupy some islands and features in the South China Sea. Malaysia first occupied 
Swallow Reef in 1983 by deploying 70 soldiers. Subsequently, Malaysia stationed 
military personnel in Ardasier Reef, Dallas Reef, and Mariveles Reef from 1986 to 
1988.244 In the uninhabited Louisa and Royal Charlotte Reefs, Malaysia built a 
navigation light and beacon to assert sovereignty. Kuala Lumpur also claimed 
Commodore Reef, which was occupied by the Philippines, and two features occupied by 
Vietnam: Amboyna Cay and Barque Canada Reef.245 In 1999, Malaysia occupied 
Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef that was claimed by the Philippines by deploying a task 
force consisting of six frigates and fighter jets.246 The relations between Malaysia and the 
Philippines further heated up when Malaysian fighter jets nearly engaged with two 
Philippine aircraft.247  
The first claim effort by the Philippines was when Tomas Cloma, a Filipino 
businessman, occupied a group of islands west of Palawan in 1956 that were considered 
as terra nullius. Cloma then ceded the islets he owned to the Philippine government in 
1974. President Ferdinand Marcos later declared the ceded islands as an integral part of 
the Philippine territory and called them the Kalayan group in Presidential decrees he 
signed.248 The decree also defined the EEZ around the Philippines and all of the islands. 
The Philippines occupied five features in 1974 and three others, including Commodore 
Reef, four years later. Manila justified these actions by saying that the islands were terra 
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nullius and using the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty as a legal basis. The treaty 
acknowledged that the Spratlys were “under the trusteeship of the Allied Powers” and 
that no Allied country formally possessed them in the 1950s.249 One of the Philippine 
claims caused an incident with Malaysia. In 1988, Malaysia seized three Philippine-
flagged fishing boats and arrested 49 fishermen accused of illegal fishing near 
Commodore Reef.250 Another incident was with Vietnam in the Kalayan Group when a 
Filipino fisherman was shot by the Vietnamese while collecting sea cucumber at Tennent 
Reef.251 
Different from the other three Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam emphasizes its 
claim in the South China Sea based on its long history in the region. An official 
document from the period of King Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497) incorporates the Paracels 
and Spratlys into Vietnam’s territory.252 Some documents from the 17th and 18th centuries 
supported Vietnam’s claim, which reported several occasions when Vietnamese assisted 
grounded foreign merchant ships in the Paracels.253 Vietnam used these reports to claim 
sovereignty over the Paracels. The claim to the Spratlys originated in the French legacy 
in the region. France occupied nine islets in the Spratly Islands from 1933 to 1939 and 
submitted a formal notice in the French Official Journal in 1933.254 Following 
independence, Vietnam inherited French sovereignty based on the principle of uti 
possidetis juris. Vietnam’s claim in the Paracels coincided with China’s and caused 
major disputes. In January 1974, 11 Chinese warships, including a destroyer and a 
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transport ship, repelled Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands.255 Vuong Van Bac, 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister, described the incident:  
The People’s Republic of China immediately resorted to military action, 
by dispatching several warships to the area and landing troops on the 
Paracels Islands [sic]. On January 19th 1974, at 8:29 hours, Chinese troops 
opened fire on the Vietnamese troops on the island of Quang-Hoa (also 
known as Duncan Island). At the same time, Communist Chinese vessels 
engaged Vietnamese vessels stationed in the area, causing heavy casualties 
and material damages. On January 20th 1974, Communist Chinese 
warplanes which had been overflying the area on previous days, joined the 
action and bombed Vietnamese positions on the islands of Hoang-Sa 
(Pattle), Cam-Tuyen (Robert) and Vinh-Lan (Money). By the evening of 
January 20th 1974, Chinese troops have landed on all the islands of the 
Hoang-Sa archipelago, a [sic] and the Chinese naval task-force seemed 
prepared to head for the Truong-Sa (Spratley) archiplego [sic].256 
The battle resulted in several deaths and wounded on both sides, damaged ships, 
and several Vietnamese and one American civilian captured by China.257 Not long after 
the incident, Saigon decided to reinforce the islands it claimed in the Spratlys to 
anticipate China’s encroachment instead of retaking the Paracels.258  This incident was 
only one of several other disputes involving Vietnam and the other claimants, which were 
related to occupation, natural resource exploration, as well as fisheries.  
 The short review of sovereignty claims of Southeast Asian countries implies that 
two bases of claim exist in the South China Sea dispute. The first is an historical 
argument that becomes Vietnam’s main argument. The other relies heavily on 
international law, which becomes the main reason for Brunei, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines to claim maritime zones in the South China Sea. The different perspectives in 
the South China Sea claims are one of the factors that make the disputes hard to resolve 
because the two are completely opposite and difficult to reconcile. The concept of 
sovereignty for the sea is a new notion in the international law compared to sovereignty 
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on land. The UNCLOS only recognizes country’s territorial sea as far as 12 nautical 
miles from the shore or the determined baselines. The territorial sea is the only zone for 
the coastal state to have full sovereignty in the sea, meaning that all within the territorial 
sea are subject to the country’s law. Moreover, UNCLOS also gives the opportunity for 
the coastal state to exercise sovereign rights, not sovereignty, in maritime zones called 
the EEZ and the continental shelf that may be extended up to 200 nautical miles from 
shore. UNCLOS also defines the requirement for maritime features that can be used to 
generate maritime zones. This problem adds complexity to the dispute resolution in the 
South China Sea, an area that already has strong factors to be disputed, such as its 
geopolitical importance and natural resources, including oil, gas, and fisheries. 
3. The Importance of the South China Sea 
At least three factors contribute to the South China Sea’s values that explain the 
unilateral claims by the six countries. The strategic values, the potential hydrocarbon 
reserves, and the presence of fishing grounds could be reasons for the disputants to claim 
maritime zones in the South China Sea. From a strategic point-of-view, the South China 
Sea contains two values. First is its location that connects the strategic straits, the Strait of 
Malacca, to the world’s major economic powers: China, Japan, and South Korea. The 
South China Sea becomes one of the world’s significant sea routes with around 11 
million barrels of oil and six trillion cubic feet of LNG transiting this sea per day.259 The 
second strategic advantage of the South China Sea is the presence of hundreds of 
unowned maritime features, which can be used to generate EEZs and continental shelf 
claims. The two strategic advantages become tools to justify countries’ claims in 
combination with the natural resources the South China Sea possesses. 
The South China Sea is famous for its potential oil and gas deposits. Existing 
literature provides various hydrocarbon reserve estimates because no significant 
prospecting has been conducted in the disputed areas. The reserves mostly lay in the 
Spratly Islands, in the South China Basin; whereas, geological evidence suggests the lack 
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of hydrocarbon resources in the Paracel Islands.260 The first survey conducted by China 
in 1989 resulted in an optimistic report about the potential of the South China Sea. It 
predicted that the Spratly Islands contained “25 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 
370,000 tons of phosphorous and 105 billion barrels of oil.”261 The report added that the 
James Shoal, a small bank off Sarawak that is claimed by Malaysia, China, and Taiwan, 
possesses approximately 91 billion barrels of oil.262 The U.S. Geological Survey 
estimated that the Spratly Islands hold significant undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves of 
an average of 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 10.3 trillion cubic feet of gas.263 All the 
reports provided were not the numbers of proven oil and gas reserves, but only an 
estimate since no real survey has been conducted in the disputed areas.  
Given the potential of the South China Sea to be explored, all six claimants 
attempted to explore the areas. Malaysia was the earliest country operating in the South 
China Sea with several key oil fields off Sabah and Sarawak. Its status as the second 
largest oil and gas producer in Southeast Asia makes the South China Sea issue 
important, as the oil and gas sector contributes 29 percent of total government revenue.264 
Malaysia focuses on developing oil and gas field in the disputed areas to offset its 
declining production in old wells; its exploration was concentrated in areas between 
James Shoal and Louisa Reef, also claimed by China, Taiwan, and Brunei.265 Production 
from these areas accounted for 70 percent of total Malaysia’s oil and gas production.266 
Brunei began oil production in 1972 with nine of its oil fields lying within China’s nine-
dashed line with a total capacity reaching 143,000 billion barrels of oil per day in 
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1992.267 Malaysia’s and Brunei’s overlapping claims in the South China Sea had been a 
source of tensions between them in 2003. In that period, the relations of both countries 
heated up due to conflicting concessions awarded to different companies in the same 
area. Malaysia’s Petronas granted rights of exploration to a U.S. company, Murphy Oil, 
at a time when Brunei was in the middle of negotiations with Total and Royal Dutch/
Shell.268 Brunei sent a gunboat to block the access of a Murphy Oil drilling ship to the 
area, which Malaysia challenged by sending navy ships to prevent a Total Company ship 
from approaching the drill location.269 
The Philippines started exploring the South China Sea in 1970 and made its first 
natural gas production in 1976.270 The location was in the Reed Bank, one of the disputed 
features off Palawan, which was estimated to have up to 3.5 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas and 165 million barrels of oil reserves.271 Despite the abundant resources, the 
Philippine government failed to attract foreign investors to work on the Reed Bank. 
China’s claim over the area has been the biggest obstacle to investment. Eduardo 
Manalac, a former Philippine energy under-secretary reveals the disappointment: “we 
went around the world to attract bidding. Nobody came. Not a single bid.”272 This 
expression recalled the 2011 confrontation with China in Reed Bank. The Philippines had 
awarded concessions in 2010 to a British oil and gas company, Forum Energy, to explore 
areas under the “Service Contract 72” (SC72) that covers Reed Bank. In February 2011, 
Forum Energy planned to survey the area by conducting a 3D seismic survey around the 
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Sampaguita oil field around Reed Bank.273 On March 2, the survey ship began its activity 
surveying Reed Bank and the surrounding waters for oil. Apparently, two Chinese Coast 
Guard vessels harassed and forced the survey ship to halt its activity. The Philippine 
military sent two surveillance aircraft to the disputed area to investigate the incident.274 
The report of investigation confirms the harassment by “two white Chinese patrol boats 
labeled no. 71 and no. 75,” and that both patrol boats “threatened to ram the research 
vessel M/V Venture.”275 The incident resulted in the area remaining underdeveloped. 
Vietnam started its quest for oil and gas in the South China Sea in the 1970s when 
the new ruler, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), defined the South China Sea as a 
top priority.276 Vietnam, however, was only able to extract its first barrel of oil in 1986 
after receiving assistance from the Soviet Union, with a focus in the White Tiger oilfield 
situated in the Cuu Long basin off the Mekong Delta.277 The discovery of natural 
resources then expanded to the southern South China Sea as Vietnam moved to occupy 
three features: Vanguard Bank, Prince Consort Bank, and Grainger Bank, which had been 
already leased by China to the Crestone Energy Corporation.278 The occupation might be 
Vietnam’s response to the Chinese concession given to Crestone on May 8, 1992. The 
development of the new area, called Wanan Bei by the Chinese, continued as Vietnam 
reached agreement in 1992 with Nopec, a Norwegian company, to survey the areas.279 
Furthermore, Vietnam awarded concessions to VietSovpetro280 and U.S. oil company 
Conoco to conduct drilling operations in the same locations as Crestone area.281 The 
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companies established the first oil rig in the Wanan Bei block in 1994. A few months 
later, China sent two frigates to the disputed areas to block the Vietnamese oil rig and 
drove away one Vietnamese supply ship.282 The Chinese government justified this 
incident as a necessary action to protect “China’s sovereignty and maritime interests.”283 
The contention in the areas continued several years later. Vietnam, again, signed an oil 
contract with ExxonMobil in 2008 in the same location as Vanguard Bank. Tension rose 
in 2011 due to China’s opposition to Vietnam’s exploration plan. In the middle of the 
dispute, Chinese vessels reportedly cut the cables of Vietnamese seismic ships in two 
different instances.284 On another occasion, Beijing organized a group of fishing vessels 
to block a Vietnamese survey ship from operating in the disputed area, while China’s 
ship conducted an oil and gas survey while escorted by Chinese warships.285 Like Reed 
Bank, development is stagnant in areas disputed by Vietnam and China in Wanan Bei. 
Fishery is another source of contention in the disputed areas as shown in several 
incidents that involved military or law-enforcement units and fishing vessels. The FAO 
ranked Area 71,286 which includes the South China Sea, as the world’s third largest fish 
producer after the Northwest Pacific and the Southeast Pacific, with the total fish 
landings in 2009 reaching 11.2 million tons, increasing steadily from just 540,000 tons in 
1950.287 The types of fish targeted by the fishermen are pelagic fishes, which includes 
tunas, sharks, herrings, sardines, squids, and other marine species. Among them, tunas 
are the main production in the region, which became the world’s leading tuna fishery as 
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the size of the catch reached 1.6 million tons in 2009.288 Despite the promising statistical 
data, the fishery stocks in the South China Sea were reportedly overexploited, which 
caused decline in some areas. One of the reasons for the deterioration in production was 
illegal fishing.  
Besides the environmental impact it causes, illegal fishing by neighboring 
countries could be the root of tensions as demonstrated in the disputed Spratly Islands. 
No less than twelve incidents related to illegal fishing were recorded in the South China 
Sea that involved China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Some of those incidents 
were only expulsion from the fishing grounds, while others involved gunfire in the form 
of warning shots. An example of confrontation related to the fishery was the naval 
standoff between the Philippines and China in the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. On April 
10, 2012, a Philippine cutter BRP Gregorio del Pilar conducted boarding operations 
onboard eight Chinese fishing vessels that were suspected of conducting fishing activity 
in areas claimed by the Philippines. The boarding team found that the Chinese fishermen 
illegally caught “corals, giant clams and live sharks.”289 The Philippine Navy intended to 
arrest the eight vessels before two Chinese coast guard cutters prevented them from doing 
so. This stand-off impacted both countries’ relations and caused further tensions. The 
violence sometimes resulted in casualties, as shown in the May 26, 2000 incident, where 
shots by Philippine officials caused the death of a Chinese fisherman.290 Not only with 
China, fishery-related conflict between ASEAN members was not something impossible. 
In January 1999, shots by Vietnamese soldiers at Tennent Reef in Kalayan Group caused 
a Philippine fisherman to be seriously wounded in the stomach, which led the Philippines 
to lodge a formal protest to the Vietnamese authority.291 These instances demonstrate 
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how the disputes over maritime zones that related to the fisheries could heat up inter-state 
relations.  
4. Seeking Possible Peaceful Settlement Mechanisms for the South China 
Sea Disputes 
Do the interstate disputes in the South China Sea always end in violence? The 
answer is certainly yes if we only refer to the above discussion. This section intends to 
show how sovereignty disputes over maritime features and the presence of natural 
sources are the primary obstacles for the claimants to reach peaceful solutions. While the 
South China Sea has become one of the maritime flashpoints in the world, the claimants 
actually have attempted to establish a certain dispute prevention mechanism. On 
November 4, 2002, ASEAN members and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The purpose of the DOC is to prevent future 
disagreements from escalating into military actions, as written in Article 10:  
The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in 
the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the 
region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual 
attainment of this objective.292  
Even though this article clearly encourages the signatories to avoid militarization, 
some countries still took a hard stance in managing the disputes. Evidence shows that the 
DOC could not prevent dispute militarization, as at least ten incidents between the 
claimants, especially involving China, still ended in hard measures using military force 
(Table 6), even though the number of intra-ASEAN conflict in the South China Sea 
decreased significantly. Another milestone in the South China Sea was the signing of the 
Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC in July 2011. However, many scholars 
view this new agreement pessimistically as it does not mention the Code of Conduct as 
written in Article 10 of the DOC.293 Furthermore, the failure of the 2012 ASEAN 
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Regional Forum (ARF) to issue a joint communiqué made the dispute resolution far from 
over. The meeting took place when Cambodia chaired ASEAN, given the suspicions 
about the failure of the ARF as Cambodia had received at least US$10 billion loans and 
investment from China.294   
Besides the effort to implement a preventive mechanism, disputing parties had put 
some efforts towards peaceful approach. As discussed in the previous chapters, this thesis 
identifies that three peaceful dispute settlements had been practiced in Southeast Asia, 
namely bilateral delimitation, third-party settlement, and joint-development. Among so 
many overlapping claims, only in two cases had countries agreed on maritime boundaries 
delimitations in the South China Sea. The first was between Indonesia and Malaysia in 
1969, when both countries finalized their continental shelf limits. Indonesia and Vietnam 
concluded another maritime delimitation in the area when signing an agreement 
concerning the continental shelf boundary on June 11, 2003. This agreement connects the 
1969 Indonesia-Malaysia continental shelf boundary. The two agreements could only be 
possible because of the position of Indonesia as a non-claimant. Indonesia has denied any 
involvement in the South China Sea dispute since the beginning, although China’s nine-
dashed line could be interpreted as encroaching on Indonesia’s EEZ. The absence of any 
Indonesian claim to islands or features in the South China Sea was the most prominent 
factor for Malaysia and Vietnam to agree on maritime delimitation. No positive 
indications signal any other overlapping claims to be concluded through this mechanism. 
Although the claimants in these two cases reached peaceful settlements through 
bilateral negotiations, the South China Sea claimants have never adopted third-party 
dispute settlement mechanisms like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore did in previous 
years. Recent developments in the South China Sea dispute show the Philippines’s effort 
to bring the dispute against China to international arbitration. This initiation met an 
obstacle as China has rejected internationalization of this dispute, including international 
arbitration. Facing China’s refusal, the Philippines submitted the dispute to the ITLOS on 
January 22, 2013. Manila then brought the case to the arbitral tribunal as an ad hoc 
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arbitration as mandated by the UNCLOS since the two parties did not agree on a 
particular form of arbitration.295 The current status of the case is pending, but the Court 
decided in October 2015 that “it has jurisdiction in the case and will hold hearings.”296 
The final resolution of the case is unknown and it is unlikely to be solved in the near 
future considering China’s position. Even if the court votes for the Philippines in the final 
decision, nobody can guarantee that China will obey the court’s decision as China had 
never involved and agreed on this mechanism. 
The last peaceful mechanism is joint-development, which only succeeded in one 
example. Brunei and Malaysia had agreed on settling their overlapping claims in the 
South China Sea when both sides chose joint-development in 2009.297 Both countries 
could reach this agreement because their claims were based on the Law of the Sea, as the 
core of the claims refers to the same source. Another effort of joint-development was the 
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between the Philippines, Vietnam, and China 
in 2005. The JMSU was actually intended to be the first phase in the future joint-
development arrangement between the three countries. The Philippine government finally 
cancelled the JMSU after receiving broad rejections from the public and the Senates, 
which accused the JMSU as a loss for the Philippines as it took place outside the area 
China and Vietnam claimed.298 The Chinese authority itself did not refuse the possibility 
of joint development, as reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s statement that preferred joint 
development rather than military conflict.299 However, joint development with China is 
unlikely as long as sovereignty is involved in the dispute, since China asserts that joint 
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development is only possible when partner countries acknowledge the sovereignty of 
China in the disputed area.300  
The three possible peaceful mechanisms seem difficult to pursue due to the nature 
of the dispute itself. What complicates it is that the conflicts in the South China Sea blend 
sovereignty considerations and economics. Since the notion of sovereignty was 
introduced in the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, this issue has been sensitive for every country. 
The same case applies in the South China Sea, where no country is likely to give up its 
claim. In addition to that, the presence of abundant hydrocarbon reserves in the disputed 
areas adds the value to the area so that every claimant will use military force to defend its 
claim. 
D. SUMMARY 
Southeast Asian countries have engaged in some military conflicts in maritime 
disputes. This chapter identifies five hot spots in Southeast Asian waters, namely the 
Andaman Sea, the Singapore Strait, the Gulf of Thailand, Ambalat, and the South China 
Sea. The detailed discussion of militarized maritime disputes in Southeast Asia shows 
that military action is common in disputed areas that are rich in natural resources and 
have contested sovereignty. Greater in-depth analysis of the South China Sea disputes 
confirms this thesis. Compared to other places, the South China Sea have had more 
incidents related to sovereignty and maritime claims. Six countries claim sovereignty 
over islets and other maritime features spread in the South China Sea with different 
arguments. The first category is the historical argument to justify the claim in the South 
China Sea, while the other is based on the rules stated in the UNCLOS. These two 
different perspectives make the overlapping claims difficult to reconcile. Furthermore, 
the abundant oil and gas reserves the South China Sea holds compel the claimants to use 
any possible means to respond to other claims, including military forces.  




This thesis has identified the impact of natural resources and sovereignty disputes 
on maritime disputes in Southeast Asia to identify the conditions under which Southeast 
Asian countries have pursued peaceful measures or military actions in responding to such 
conflicts. This question arose from the observation of different paths taken by Southeast 
Asian countries in their maritime disputes, namely delimitation arrangements, joint 
development, third-party settlements, and militarization. This thesis examined four case 
studies from those outcomes to find the relationship between the two factors and the 
outcomes. The case studies discussed in this thesis are: 1) the maritime delimitation 
between Indonesia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait; 2) joint-development 
arrangements in the Gulf of Thailand; 3) a dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over 
Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge; and 4) maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea. The analysis of the four case studies reveals that the presence or absence of 
natural resources and sovereignty disputes affects the decisions that countries made in 
their maritime disputes.  
This thesis identifies four circumstances characterized by the presence or absence 
of natural resources and sovereignty issues that influence the outcome of maritime 
disputes in Southeast Asia. Among those, ASEAN members managed to resolve or 
handle maritime disputes peacefully according to the TAC norms in three circumstances: 
in the absence of natural resources and sovereignty disputes, in disputes that include 
sovereignty issues in resource-lack areas, and in areas that contain abundant natural 
resources without sovereignty problems over islands or other maritime features. In 
addition to that, only one type of maritime dispute fails to be settled peacefully, namely 
ones that involve sovereignty disputes over islands or other features in resource-rich 
areas. This chapter will first summarize the findings concerning the roles of the two 
variables—natural resources and sovereignty disputes—in the case studies to answer the 
research question. This chapter will also address possible outcomes of ongoing disputes 
and unresolved maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia using the four hypotheses 
proposed in this thesis. 
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A. ROLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES  
1. Natural Resources 
This thesis found that natural resources are important factors for Southeast Asian 
countries in determining the course of disputes. The more valuable the areas, the stronger 
the countries defend their claims; in contrast, the less beneficial the disputed seas, the 
greater the incentive to compromise and seek resolution. Natural resources can be 
anything priceless, from hydrocarbon reserves to fisheries, which add value to the 
disputed areas. Besides that, the strategic value of the seas is also considered to be 
important as shown in several places, such as the Singapore Strait and the South China 
Sea. However, the presence of oil and natural gas reserves seems to be the strongest 
reason that is considered by disputing countries, which influences their relations with the 
opposing country. This is because international law, in this case UNCLOS, rules that 
every coastal country possesses sovereign rights in the seas beyond their land up to 
certain limits. One of those rights is the right to exploit what is beneath the seabed in the 
distance up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines or 300 nautical miles under certain 
circumstances. This allows the coastal states to exploit natural resources lying on the 
seabed for the benefit of their economies. The presence of these buried treasures often 
becomes the source of contention between two states that have overlapping continental 
shelf claims. 
This thesis identifies two outcomes when maritime disputes took place in 
resource-poor areas: bilateral delimitation agreements and third-party settlements. In the 
discussion about maritime delimitation arrangements, most of the cases took place in 
resource-poor areas. The maritime boundary agreement can be interpreted as a 
compromise between two countries that ends their maritime border disputes permanently. 
The discussion about all maritime delimitations in Southeast Asia in Chapter II reveals 
that the absence of natural resources is one of the factors that ease bilateral negotiations 
to reach final agreements on fixed maritime boundaries. This thesis uses delimitation 
agreements between Singapore and Indonesia in the Singapore Strait as a case study to 
demonstrate how these two countries eventually finalized their maritime borders. The 
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process of delimitation took place in three periods: 1973, 2009, and 2014. By the signing 
of the 2014 agreement, Indonesia and Singapore left no more maritime boundaries to be 
drawn between them. The Singapore Strait is an example of an area that lacks natural 
resources even though it possesses high strategic value. One exception is the continental 
shelf agreement in 1969 between Indonesia and Malaysia, which took place in the Natuna 
Sea and the South China Sea that are known for being rich in hydrocarbon reserves. This 
happened because Jakarta and Singapore signed the agreement before they actually knew 
the potential of the areas, and because Indonesia needed to secure Malaysia’s support for 
the concept of an archipelagic nation that Indonesia introduced to the international 
community. Other than this case, all delimitation arrangements in Southeast Asia lay in 
resource-poor areas.  
Another approach Southeast Asian countries used in resource-poor areas was 
dispute settlement through international arbitration. The analysis of the Pedra Branca 
dispute between Malaysia and Singapore demonstrates the minimal role of natural 
resources in the dispute. The Strait of Singapore has no basins containing either 
petroleum products or natural gas. The Strait also produces a limited amount of marine 
resources. Both countries failed to solve the dispute through bilateral negotiation due to 
the sovereignty dispute over three features. The absence of natural resources, however, 
provided an opportunity for both parties to solve the dispute, albeit through unusual 
means: international arbitration.  
Although maritime delimitations and third-party settlements tend to happen in 
resource-poor areas, Southeast Asian countries used joint development and militarization 
to address maritime disputes in resource-rich areas. This thesis has proven that the 
presence of abundant natural resources is the main factor in employing the joint-
development approach. Southeast Asian countries have adopted joint-development 
arrangements since 1979 when Malaysia and Thailand agreed on jointly developing 
disputed seas in the Gulf of Thailand. Since then, six other joint-development agreements 
have been signed. The most recent was the Brunei and Malaysia agreement to cooperate 
in disputed areas in the South China Sea in 2009. Joint development is a provisional 
measure countries may take if the agreement over maritime boundaries is hard to achieve. 
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Joint development is not the only form of provisional arrangement UNCLOS mentions, 
but it always happens in resource-rich areas. The discussion of joint development practice 
in the Gulf of Thailand reveals the importance of hydrocarbon reserves in making 
countries agree on such arrangements. The economic potential from oil and natural gas 
they could exploit prevented them from reaching permanent delimitation; thus, joint 
development can be seen as a win-win option that countries could choose even though it 
is temporary in nature. Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have enjoyed joint-development 
arrangements from oil and gas companies operating in the overlapping areas without 
having permanent delimitations. Cambodia had tried to make a similar agreement with 
Thailand, but unfortunately it has not yet been implemented because tensions between the 
two countries have sometimes heated up over unrelated issues. Regardless of the outcome 
experienced by the countries, the presence of abundant natural resources, proven or 
unproven, determines the potential for joint development.      
Unlike a peaceful outcome like joint development, maritime disputes in resource-
rich areas may also end in violence. The overlapping claims in the South China Sea are 
the best example to show the failures of many countries to restrain themselves from 
deploying military forces in disputes that lie in resource-rich areas. The South China Sea 
is known for its oil and natural gas reserves, one of the reasons to explain China’s interest 
in the area despite the historical justifications they claim. Similar to the Gulf of Thailand, 
potential economic benefits from natural resources hinder most efforts to seek a 
permanent resolution. In the South China Sea disputes, four Southeast Asian claimants 
perceived natural resources as the main incentive for their claim since the claim over the 
EEZs and continental shelves involve attaining an exclusive privilege to extract the 
natural resources.  
In brief, natural resources drove the disputing states to choose either a permanent 
or provisional resolution over their maritime disputes. The approach of having permanent 
outcomes through bilateral agreements or international arbitration mostly involves areas 
that lack natural resources. This shows the compliance of Southeast Asian countries to 
compromise in the absence of potential economic benefits. By contrast, they mostly 
resisted giving up their claims in resource-rich areas as shown in joint development and 
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dispute militarization. The former is a temporary peaceful solution, while the latter does 
not reach compromise at all with deployment of military forces. The value of the areas 
due to the presence of natural resources seems to be the main reason for the countries’ 
failure to reach permanent resolution. The two main outcomes—permanent and non-
permanent resolutions—then further diverged based on the next variable: sovereignty 
issues.   
2. Sovereignty Issues  
Sovereignty issues have always been serious for Southeast Asian countries. This 
thesis finds a strong correlation between sovereignty issues and natural resources in 
shaping the final outcomes countries made for their maritime disputes. The analysis of 
four case studies showed that the absence of sovereignty issues over the disputed seas 
simplified reaching consensus; whereas, sovereignty disputes complicated the problems. 
Sovereignty disputes meant here are those applied to land, islands, or other maritime 
features. According to the UNCLOS, sovereign states cannot claim sovereignty over the 
EEZ and continental shelf; instead, they only have sovereign rights over those maritime 
zones. Coastal states can only claim sovereignty over land, islands, and other features that 
fulfill requirements as mentioned in the UNCLOS. The status of these features is 
important because they generate the EEZs and the continental shelves. The relations 
between sovereignty issues and natural resources can be seen in the final outcomes. 
Permanent and non-permanent solutions influenced by natural resources take different 
courses when associated with the sovereignty problem. 
This thesis identified two permanent resolutions that resulted from the absence of 
natural resources: delimitation agreements and third-party settlements. Disputing 
countries committed to bilaterally negotiate their maritime problems if no disputes 
concerned island or features sovereignty. When Indonesia and Singapore managed to 
finalize their maritime borders in the Singapore Strait, sovereignty statuses of all islands 
spread across the strait were clear. Their former colonial powers made it clear in the 1824 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty. In the treaty, the British and the Dutch agreed to use the main route 
of sea traffic in the Singapore Strait as a line separating their territories. Anything north 
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of the route belonged to the British, whereas any islands lying south of the route belonged 
to the Dutch. Indonesia as a former Dutch colony and Singapore as a former British 
colony retained this principle when they became independent states. Since both countries 
had no sovereignty problems in the Singapore Strait, the agreement was easily achieved. 
A different situation applies to the Malaysian and Singaporean dispute over Pedra 
Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. While the disputed location is also in the 
resource-poor Singapore Strait, Malaysia and Singapore had different perspectives 
regarding the sovereignty of disputed features. Malaysia argued that the sovereignty over 
Pedra Branca and the two others had always remained under Johor’s administration. On 
the other hand, Singapore claimed that the sovereignty of the islands had passed to the 
British since 1847, when they built a lighthouse on Pedra Branca. Both countries then 
brought the dispute to international arbitration after failing to reach a compromise during 
bilateral negotiations. This case shows that sovereignty issues would worsen the disputes 
and prevent the disputing parties from reaching a solution through bilateral channels. The 
choice of using international arbitration then became a feasible solution for Malaysia and 
Singapore to end the conflict situated in a resource-poor sea like the Singapore Strait. 
Even though each party had a 50 percent chance of losing, the approach through 
international arbitration was still considered acceptable since no other stakes would be 
lost to the opposing party. Their behaviors might have been different if the disputed areas 
contained abundant natural resources. The Indonesia-Malaysia dispute in the resource-
rich Ambalat region illustrated how the conflict remains unresolved even though the ICJ 
has decided the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. Unlike Singapore and 
Malaysia’s joint-maritime survey post-ICJ decision, Indonesia and Malaysia have had 
several military skirmishes in the disputed areas. The story of Pedra Branca reflects the 
greater chance for intra-state disputes to be solved, even though the process might be 
lengthy and difficult due to sovereignty issues. 
Sovereignty performs a similar role in non-permanent solutions adopted by 
Southeast Asian countries: an absence of sovereignty problems will have greater 
likelihood of reaching compromise than disputes with sovereignty issues. Joint 
development is the option when no sovereignty disputes aggravate maritime conflicts in 
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resource-rich areas like the Gulf of Thailand. Both joint-development arrangements 
discussed in Chapter III concerned overlapping areas free from sovereignty issues. 
Malaysia and Thailand signed the MoU of joint development in 1979 agreeing to 
establish the joint authority to develop their overlapping area. When signing the MoU, 
both countries lacked sovereignty issues in the overlapping claims since all sovereignty 
issues for offshore islands in the Gulf had been resolved with the 1909 Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty. The claims were only a matter of the differing UNCLOS interpretation. The same 
case applies to Malaysia and Vietnam when they agreed on signing a joint development 
arrangement in the Gulf of Thailand. The unilateral claims by Malaysia and Vietnam 
were not related to the sovereignty dispute, but the UNCLOS understanding. The 
countries did not even share land borders, so a sovereignty problem is nearly impossible. 
Overall, the Gulf of Thailand is an area with few sovereignty disputes resulting from 
treaties signed during colonial eras. Clear sovereignty status would probably be the best 
reason to explain why Southeast Asian countries in the Gulf of Thailand managed to 
establish some joint development arrangements.    
Unlike the rich and peaceful Gulf of Thailand, country claimants in the South 
China Sea tend to use military force to respond to other’s actions. Having the same 
abundant natural resources as the Gulf of Thailand, hundreds of features without clear 
sovereignty status spread throughout the South China Sea added to the complexity of the 
disputes. The sovereignty disputes on maritime features in the South China Sea emerged 
for two different reasons. One group used the UNCLOS to claim sovereignty over these 
features; the other based their claims on history. The unresolved sovereignty of these 
features in the South China Sea stemmed from the failure of colonial powers in Southeast 
Asia to claim possession of them, because none of them were uninhabited nor contained 
any advantages for the Western imperial powers. The colonial legacy was important for 
Southeast Asian countries since they mostly accepted their boundaries based on what 
they inherited from the ruling powers. However, some countries then considered features 
in the South China Sea as terra nullius. The combination of abundant hydrocarbon 
reserves and widespread sovereignty problems has resulted in prolonged disputes with 
the involvement of military forces. 
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3. The Pattern of Maritime Dispute Outcomes in Southeast Asia 
The brief summary of the role of the two variables—natural resources and 
sovereignty—in Southeast Asian maritime disputes, which resulted in four different 
outcomes, brings this thesis to four conclusions. First, Southeast Asian countries easily 
cooperate to seek maritime delimitation through bilateral discussions for the disputes that 
are located in resource-poor areas with no sovereignty problem over surrounding 
features. Second, joint development is the most common approach when natural 
resources are abundant and sovereignty disputes are low. Third, when two states engage 
in sovereignty disputes in resource-rich areas, third-party settlement through international 
arbitration is the preferable option. Fourth, disputing countries are likely to engage in 
military conflicts when they dispute sovereignty over islands in seas that contain an 
abundance of oil and natural gas reserves. The first three are the conditions where 
ASEAN members are likely to have peaceful resolution or settlement according to the 
TAC norms for their maritime disputes; whereas, such peaceful ways are unlikely 
adhered by Southeast Asian countries when having maritime disputes in areas with 
abundant hydrocarbon resources that involve sovereignty disputes over islands or 
maritime features. Table 7 depicts the relations between natural resources and 
sovereignty that result in the four outcomes. 
Table 7.   Natural Resources, Sovereignty, and the Dispute Outcomes 




No Bilateral agreements Third-party settlement  
Yes Joint development Military action 
B. THE PROSPECT OF ONGOING MARITIME DISPUTES IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
This thesis identifies causal factors of the four maritime dispute outcomes 
experienced by Southeast Asian countries. In each outcome, both natural resources and 
sovereignty over islands play important roles. The next important point to address is 
undelimited maritime boundaries and ongoing maritime disputes in Southeast Asia. Sam 
Bateman et al., suggest that no more than twenty percent of 60 maritime boundaries in 
 115
Southeast Asian waters have been delimited.301 Most maritime boundaries remain 
undelimited because three types of maritime zones might have to be delimited in the 
areas, namely territorial seas, EEZs, and continental shelves. An example of an 
incomplete delimitation of maritime boundary is the agreement between Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the northern part of the Strait of Malacca. In 1969, both countries signed an 
agreement to delimit the seabed of the Strait of Malacca after they signed and ratified the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The 1969 agreement was the only document 
related to the maritime boundaries that Indonesia and Malaysia have signed until now; 
they left the EEZ undelimited. Other instances of unresolved maritime boundaries are 
between Malaysia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait and between Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea following two ICJ decisions. And, of course, people worry 
that the South China Sea disputes will destabilize the region. Facing so many 
uncertainties in the maritime realm, coastal states should anticipate the most probable 
outcome for these ongoing disputes because any unclear boundaries, including those at 
sea, could be a source of conflict. 
This thesis was not originally intended as a forecasting tool for current or future 
maritime disputes in Southeast Asia; however, the findings of this thesis might be useful 
for prediction. Any government might hope to have final maritime boundaries in areas 
free from sovereignty issues and lacking natural resources. Malaysia and Indonesia could 
probably find a solution through bilateral negotiation for their undelimited EEZ in the 
northern part of the Strait of Malacca because the area fulfills the criteria. The same case 
applies for maritime boundaries around Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks. Since the 
ownership of Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks are no longer disputed, Malaysia and 
Singapore could probably manage to fix the maritime boundaries through bilateral 
negotiations. The maritime boundary delimitation in this area is important for two 
reasons. First, it will determine the ownership of South Ledge. Second, it will be used for 
delimiting the final boundaries in the Singapore Strait that requires the involvement of 
Indonesia. The joint survey conducted by Malaysia and Singapore could be a good sign 
                                                 
301 Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho, and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia, RSIS Policy 
Paper (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, 2009), 16, 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PR090427_Good_Order_at_Sea_in_SEA.pdf. 
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for permanent delimitation. In Ambalat, joint development could be a temporary solution 
for Indonesia and Malaysia since the source of conflict, the ownership of Sipadan and 
Ligitan Islands, have been resolved through the ICJ decision. Achieving fixed maritime 
boundaries in Ambalat could be hard to achieve due to the presence of potential 
hydrocarbon reserves. Last, the South China Sea will produce tense conflicts when no 
countries willingly drop their claims. What Malaysia did to give up its claim over Louisa 
Reef is the best example to show that any country could turn contentious conflict into a 
certain arrangement like joint development for mutual benefit. The next question left 
unaddressed in this thesis is why some countries resolved their maritime disputes in a 
relatively brief time while others took decades or even left them unresolved. The possible 
answer might be related to the domestic politics of each country and interstate relations 
that are certainly beyond the scope of this thesis, and thus needs further research.   
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